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HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
 
Isaac B. Rosenberg* 
 
This Article looks critically at heightism, i.e., prejudice or 
discrimination against a person on the basis of his or her height. 
Although much scholarship has focused on other forms of trait-based 
discrimination—most notably weight and appearance discrimination, 
both of which indirectly involve height as a component—little has 
focused on “pure” height discrimination. Nevertheless, within the past 
five years courts, scholars, and legislatures have increasingly tackled 
these non-traditional forms of discrimination. As such, this Article 
endeavors to fill the gap in the existing scholarship. 
This Article specifically focuses on heightism in the workplace, with 
an emphasis on prejudice against short people because of the unique 
disadvantages they face vis-à-vis their taller counterparts. It examines 
the ways that existing federal antidiscrimination laws—namely Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990—do and do not protect against height-based prejudice in the 
workplace. Moreover, after briefly examining state and local remedies 
for height discrimination, including state antidiscrimination laws, this 
Article considers but ultimately rejects enacting a federal law that would 
flatly prohibit all height-based employment decisions. Although a 
comprehensive prohibition would be easiest to administer, such a 
prohibition would prove both gratuitous and unwise. Instead, this Article 
recommends modest changes to federal regulations and increased state 
and local enforcement.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Well, I don’t want no Short People 
Don’t want no Short People 
Don’t want no Short People 
Round here.”1 
 
At first blush, the concept of real height discrimination is almost laughable. 
After all, we do not typically think of height when we discuss types of 
discrimination.2 Yet there is no denying that we place a high premium on height, 
                                                 
1  RANDY NEWMAN, Short People, on LITTLE CRIMINALS (Warner Bros. Records 
1977). 
2  See LESLIE F. MARTEL & HENRY B. BILLER, STATURE AND STIGMA: THE 
BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SHORT MALES 2 (1984). Despite the palpably strong 
relationship between height, behavior, and personality, researchers largely ignored the 
issue until the advent of synthetic growth hormone therapy. See id. at 3–4. As one 
researcher speculated, “I think the whole problem makes everybody nervous all around 
with short people themselves wishing the issue would just go away, [and] normal sized 
people wishing short people would just go away.” Id. at 3 (quoting RALPH KEYES, THE 
HEIGHT OF YOUR LIFE 92 (1980)) (alterations in original). 
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be it social, sexual, or economic, and our preference for height pervades almost 
every aspect of our lives. Economist John Kenneth Galbraith—who towered at six 
feet eight inches3—described the favored treatment we afford taller people as one 
of the “most blatant and forgiven prejudices” in our society.4 If you do not believe 
it, consider whether you yourself would like to be taller and try putting your finger 
on the reason why, or why not.5 
This Article looks critically at heightism, i.e., prejudice or discrimination 
against a person on the basis of his or her height. 6 It specifically focuses on 
heightism in the workplace, particularly prejudice against short people because of 
the unique disadvantages they face compared with their taller counterparts. 
Although much scholarship has focused on other forms of trait-based 
discrimination—most notably discrimination based on weight7 and appearance,8 
both of which indirectly involve height as a component—little if any scholarship 
has focused on “pure” height discrimination.9 Thus, this Article aims to fill that 
                                                 
3  See N.R. Kleinfield, For Tall Executives: Two Bumps A Day, $600 An Inch, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1987, at A6. 
4  See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arthur Ungur, Galbraith: 
Turning Economics to Show Biz, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 18, 1977, at 22). 
Galbraith went on to observe: “We tall men, being higher than anybody else, are much 
more visible and thus more closely watched. Therefore it follows that our behavior is 
naturally superior. So the world instinctively and rightly trusts tall men.” Id.; see also 
Robert Fulford, It’s A Tall World, After All, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct. 13, 1993, at C1. 
(“Height remains one of the last frontiers of unabashed prejudice.”). 
5  See STEPHEN S. HALL, SIZE MATTERS: HOW HEIGHT AFFECTS THE HEALTH, 
HAPPINESS, AND SUCCESS OF BOYS—AND THE MEN THEY BECOME 270 (2006) (“It’s a no-
brainer. . . . Everyone wants to be taller. If you’re five-ten, you want to be six-two.”). 
6  Credit for “heightism” goes to sociologist Saul Feldman, who coined the phrase in 
the early 1970s. See Heightism, TIME, Oct. 4, 1971, at 64.   
7  See, e.g., Molly Henry, Note, Do I Look Fat? Perceiving Obesity as a Disability 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1761 (2007); Jane Byeff Korn, 
Fat, 77 B.U. L. REV. 25 (1997); Elizabeth Kristen, Comment, Addressing the Problem of 
Weight Discrimination in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 57 (2002); Karol V. Mason, Note, 
Employment Discrimination Against the Overweight, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 337 (1982).  
8  See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Comment, Appearance Matters: A Proposal to 
Prohibit Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 196 (2000); 
Heather R. James, Note, If You Are Attractive and You Know It, Please Apply: Appearance 
Based Discrimination and Employers’ Discretion, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 629, 660 (2008); 
Karen Zakrzewski, Comment, The Prevalence of “Look”ism in Hiring Decisions: How 
Federal Law Should be Amended to Prevent Appearance Discrimination in the Workplace, 
7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 432 (2005). 
9  Paul Steven Miller, a former commissioner of the U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission who now serves as both Henry M. Jackson Professor of Law and 
Director of the Disability Studies Program at the University of Washington, wrote a 
thoughtful piece more than twenty years ago about workplace discrimination against little 
people who suffer from no other physical impairments, emphasizing liability under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. See Paul Steven Miller, Note, Coming Up Short: Employment 
Discrimination Against Little People, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231 (1987). 
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gap by examining how existing federal antidiscrimination laws—namely Title VII 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990—do and do not protect against 
height-based prejudice in the workplace. 
Part II explores the pervasiveness of heightism generally and its specific 
impact on hiring, wages, and other aspects of employment. Part III looks at the 
various ways plaintiffs have pursued height-based claims under Title VII and 
suggests a new approach to such claims: characterizing heightism, in some cases, 
as a kind of impermissible gender stereotyping. Part IV considers height under the 
ADA—including the ADA Amendments Act of 2008—and contends that height 
outside the “normal range,” as defined by this Article, qualifies as an 
“impairment”; Part IV also considers height-based claims under the ADA’s 
“regarded as” prong. Finally, Part V briefly examines state and local remedies for 
height discrimination, including state common law and antidiscrimination laws, 
and considers whether Congress should enact a comprehensive height 
discrimination law flatly prohibiting height-based employment decisions. Part V 
concludes that, although a comprehensive prohibition would be easiest to 
administer, such a prohibition would prove both gratuitous and unwise. Rather, 
modest amendments to the federal regulations and increased state and local 
enforcement should suffice. 
 
II.  THE REALITIES OF HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION 
 
A.  Heightism, Generally 
 
Heightism is instinctive. We cannot help making subconscious height-based 
comparisons.10 We engage in “gaze behavior”—a primitive way of establishing 
social hierarchies on the basis of whether we are looking up to or down on 
another—whenever we encounter someone.11 To those we look down on, we 
ascribe less social power and negative character traits.12 We even afford short 
people less personal space.13 Those we look up to, however, enjoy a “halo effect,” 
                                                 
10  See MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 35 (citing SEYMOUR FISHER, BODY 
EXPERIENCE IN FANTASY AND BEHAVIOR (1970)).  
11  See id. at 34. 
12  See id. at 34–35 (citing RALPH KEYES, THE HEIGHT OF YOUR LIFE 92 (1980)); see 
also David E. Sandberg & Melissa Colsman, Assessment of Psychosocial Aspects of Short 
Stature, 21 GROWTH, GENETICS & HORMONES 17, 19 (2005) (“With few exceptions, both 
children and adults attribute significantly less favorable characteristics to short individuals 
compared to those of tall or average height.”) (citations omitted)); Short Guys Finish Last; 
Heightism, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 1995, at 19 [hereinafter Short Guys Finish Last] 
(“Both men and women, whether short or tall, thought that short men—heights between 
5’2’ and 5’5”—were less mature, less positive, less secure, less masculine; less successful, 
less capable, less confident, less outgoing; more inhibited, more timid, more passive; and 
so on.”). 
13  See MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 35 (citing Kent G. Bailey et al., Body Size 
as Implied Threat: Effects on Personal Space and Person Perception, 43 PERCEPTUAL & 
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the automatic attribution of positive personality characteristics to them because of 
their height.14 This is perhaps most evident in our selection of presidents.15 We 
almost always elect the taller presidential candidate.16 In fact, we have not elected 
a shorter-than-average president since 189617 and have elected scarcely a half-
dozen short presidents overall.18 Furthermore, a candidate’s margin of victory 
derives, in part, from his height.19 
Heightism is also inculcated. Our language is rife with heightist idioms.20 As 
children, we are constantly reminded of how much we have grown, and we are 
                                                                                                                            
MOTOR SKILLS 223, 223–30 (1976)). One study showed that we accord more than twice as 
much personal space to tall people than we do to short people. See id. (quoting J.J. Hartnett 
et al., Body Height, Position, and Sex as Determinants of Personal Space, 87 J. PSYCHOL. 
129, 134 (1974)). 
14  See id. at 36 (citing Edward L. Thorndike, A Constant Error in Psychological 
Ratings, 4 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 25, 25 (1920)). 
15  So much so that one dedicated journalist has spent the past twenty years reminding 
us how much we care about how tall our president is. See generally Jay Mathews, Is Voting 
a Measured Decision?, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2008, at C1; Jay Mathews, The Election: 
It’s Inching Down on Us; Height Used to Matter to Voters, but Things May Be Looking up 
for Shorter Candidates, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at C1; Jay Mathews, Tall Tales & 
Presidential Timber; Taking Full Measures Long Before November, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 
1992, at C4; Jay Mathews, Politics & the Height of Bias: And Now, a Short Word, WASH. 
POST, June 12, 1988, at F1. 
16  See Nicola Persico et al., The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor Market 
Outcomes: The Case of Height, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1019, 1020 (2004) (observing in 2004 
that, “[i]n the past 13 U.S. presidential elections, the taller candidate has won 10 times”); 
see also Open N.Y., The Measure of a President, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2008/10/06/opinion/06opchart.html (indicating that 
the taller candidate has won nineteen of the last twenty-nine elections dating back to 1896). 
Including George W. Bush’s victory over the taller John Kerry in 2004 and Barack 
Obama’s victory over the shorter John McCain in 2008, the shorter candidate has won only 
four of the past fourteen elections. See id. 
17  See Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, The Effect of Physical Height on 
Workplace Success and Income: Preliminary Test of a Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 428, 428 (2004). President McKinley, who was first elected in 1896, was only 
5’7”––and was ridiculed for being a “little boy.” See id. 
18  See Persico, supra note 16, at 1021, fig.1. James Madison was the shortest at 5’4”. 
See id.  
19  See Stewart J.H. McCann, Height, Societal Threat, and the Victory Margin in 
Presidential Elections (1824-1992), 88 PSYCHOL. REPORTS 741, 741–42 (2001). 
20  Compare sayings that underscore the disadvantages of being short or small (short 
shrift; coming up short; short end of the stick; caught short; draw the short straw; short 
change; feel small) with those that highlight the virtues of being big or tall (look up to 
someone; big man on campus; head and shoulders above the rest; stand tall; be the bigger 
person; make it big). 
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encouraged to “eat our vegetables” and “drink milk” so we can grow up to be “big 
and strong.”21 
Even science has contributed to negative perceptions of short stature. In the 
early twentieth century, eugenists identified short stature as an inferior trait,22 and 
scientists thereafter set out to fix the “problem.”23 In the 1950s, scientists began 
treating some slow-growing children with human growth hormone (HGH) 
extracted from the pituitary glands of cadavers, but such treatment was 
administered only to those with diagnosed medical deficiencies because of limited 
supply.24 In the mid-1980s, however, the number of people receiving HGH 
treatment exploded with the advent of synthetic HGH, and included many who 
suffered from no diagnosable growth disorders.25 Although much of the ensuing 
debate over HGH focused on whether shortness (as opposed to growth deficiency) 
constituted a disease in itself,26 the underlying issue about which all seemed to 
agree was how bad it is to be short.27 Proponents of greater availability of HGH 
focused on the fact that being short “handicaps a [person] in the competition for 
schools, jobs, income, and ‘mates.’”28 Ultimately, the wider availability of HGH 
                                                 
21  See MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 19; see also Short Guys Finish Last, supra 
note 12 (“As boys grow, the importance of height is drummed into them incessantly. ‘My, 
how tall you are!’ the relatives squeal with approval. Or, with scorn, ‘Don’t you want to 
grow up big and strong?’”). 
22  Eugenist Charles Davenport investigated the inheritance of height. See Charles B. 
Davenport, Inheritance of Stature, 2 GENETICS 313, 315–17 (1917). Davenport’s peers, 
Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, promoted the inferiority of certain ethnic groups 
because of their “dwarfish stature.” See also ROBERT MICHAEL, A CONCISE HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN ANTISEMITISM 130 (2005) (noting that one scholar viewed Jews as having a 
“dwarfish stature”). Vernon Kellogg went so far as to criticize military conscription, on the 
eve of World War I, because drafts and war lessened the genetic stock of a nation; the 
derivative loss of tall, strong men to war diminished “the stature of the next generation.” 
Vernon Kellogg, Eugenics and Militarism, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1913, at 105. 
23  One article published in a prominent pediatric journal described it as “[t]he 
Disability of Short Stature.”  See C.M. Law, The Disability of Short Stature, 62 ARCHIVES 
OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 855, 855 (1987). Another article characterized children of short 
stature as “psychologically handicapped.” See Melvin M. Grumbach, Growth Hormone 
Therapy and the Short End of the Stick, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 238, 240 (1988); cf. Patrik 
K.E. Magnusson et al., Strong Inverse Association Between Height and Suicide in a Large 
Cohort of Swedish Men: Evidence of Early Life Origins of Suicidal Behavior?, 162 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1373, 1374 (2005) (finding that short men are twice as likely to commit 
suicide as tall men, perhaps as a result of poor childhood socialization, lower social class in 
adulthood, childhood stress, stigmatization and discrimination, and higher risk of 
psychosis). 
24  See Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy, and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law 
in FDA Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1135, 1179–80 (2005). 
25  See id. 
26  See CARL ELLIOTT, BETTER THAN WELL: AMERICAN MEDICINE MEETS THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 241 (2003). 
27  See id. 
28  Id. (citations omitted). 
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treatment made more people view short stature as a problem to be fixed.29 Perhaps 
that explains why more and more short—but otherwise healthy—adults have 
turned to “limb lengthening” to combat the stigma of short stature.30 
Yet even though our instinctive and inculcated preference for height is 
pervasive, we do not generally acknowledge its existence.31 There may be two 
reasons for this: 
 
Either the awareness regarding discrimination is not in the consciousness 
of one or both individuals in a particular social situation, or verbalization 
of the discrimination is suppressed. The result is that the short [person] 
feels that something is subtly awry, but he cannot pin it down. He may 
believe that this discrimination is based on the social feedback that he 
does not look quite right, that he falls significantly short of the cultural 
ideal for height.32 
 
Strive as victims of height discrimination may, combating heightism is “like 
fighting a ghost.”33 
 
                                                 
29  Joel Frader, a doctor and ethicist in the Medical Humanities and Bioethics Program 
at Northwestern University, characterized the FDA’s decision to approve expanded 
availability and use of HGH as “tragic” because it “medicalized short stature and turned it 
into an illness.” HALL, supra note 5, at 245. 
30  Limb lengthening is an expensive and painful procedure by which a surgeon 
“divides a long bone into two or more sections, separates the sections slightly and braces 
the bone and limb with metal ‘scaffolding,’” then adjusts the pins and screws on this frame 
“to keep tension between the sections, enabling the bone to grow back together gradually 
into a complete but longer bone.” MayoClinic.com, Dwarfism: Treatments and Drugs, 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/dwarfism/DS01012/DSECTION=treatments-and-drugs 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009); see also Caitlin Gibson, Growing Pains: For Caitlin Schroeder, 
Achieving Near-Average Height Would Require No Small Act of Courage, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 30, 2008, at W10 (describing the procedure and its sometimes painful consequences); 
Joe Kita, All to be Tall, MEN’S HEALTH, Jan/Feb 2004, at 132–35 (describing leg 
lengthening procedure). 
Limb lengthening is particularly popular in China, where thousands of otherwise 
healthy Chinese people who fear height discrimination undergo the procedure. See Xun 
Zeng, Enforcing Equal Employment Opportunities in China, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 
991, 1002 (2007); see also Joe Kita & Lee Kynaston, Men Who Risk It All to be Tall, THE 
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 5, 2004, at 8 (noting an increase among short men in England who turn 
to limb lengthening as a cosmetic procedure). 
31  See MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 38 (“Discrimination against short males, 
although often subtle, remains a powerful factor in their lives. . . . Society positively frames 
an identity for the short female by labeling her as ‘cute’ or ‘dainty,’ while the short boy is 
just plain short.”). 
32  Id. 
33  Id. (quoting RALPH KEYES, THE HEIGHT OF YOUR LIFE 92 (1980)). 
914 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
B.  The Impact of Heightism in Employment 
 
No matter its source, the problem is prejudice.34 Height-based prejudice 
permeates employment decisions—perhaps as much as race and gender.35 It begins 
with hiring. For example, when researchers asked a group of recruiters to make a 
hypothetical hiring decision between two equally qualified candidates who differed 
only in height, 72 percent of the recruiters chose the taller candidate.36 
Height also affects wages. Data suggest that every additional inch in height is 
associated with a 1.8 to 2.2 percent increase in wages37—or roughly $789 per inch, 
per year.38 Moreover, the tallest 25 percent of the population gets a 13 percent 
boost in median income compared with the shortest 25 percent.39 In socially 
oriented jobs such as sales and management, height was shown to be predictive of 
earnings.40 Although some speculate that taller people earn more because of a 
correlation between height and intelligence,41 studies controlling for intelligence 
continue to find a significant relationship between height and earnings.42 Similarly 
controlling for gender, height continues to affect wages.43 Height’s effect does not 
decline over time; in fact, its importance may even increase as we age.44 
Finally, height affects professional advancement. Height impacts self-esteem 
(how individuals regard themselves) and social esteem (how individuals are 
regarded by others), which in turn affect actual job performance, perceived job 
performance, and, ultimately, professional success.45 It is hardly a coincidence that 
58 percent of Fortune 500 CEOs are six feet or taller (compared with roughly 14.5 
percent of all men) and 30 percent are 6’2” or taller (compared with 3.9 percent of 
                                                 
34  Id. at 36 (quoting JOHN S. GILLIS, TOO TALL TOO SMALL 61 (1982)). 
35  See Persico, supra note 16, at 1020–21. In fact, one economist has suggested that 
“[t]he gross mistake is that much of what we normally assume is sex discrimination is 
height discrimination. Of course, heightism affects both men and women, but because 
women average 4 to 5 inches shorter than men, it affects [women] more.” Dennis D. 
Miller, Ending Job Bias Can Be a Tall Order, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1995, at 1. 
36  See MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 38; see also Short Guys Finish Last, supra 
note 12, at 20 (noting the results of one study conducted in 1969). 
37  See Persico, supra note 16, at 1021. 
38  See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 
88 (2005). 
39  HALL, supra note 5, at 185. 
40  See Judge & Cable, supra note 17, at 436–37. Although height was found to be less 
significant in less socially driven occupations, it still had an effect. Id. 
41  See Julian V. Roberts & C. Peter Herman, The Psychology of Height: An Empirical 
Review, in 3 PHYSICAL APPEARANCE, STIGMA, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: THE ONTARIO 
SYMPOSIUM 113, 122 (C. Peter Herman et al. eds., 1986). 
42  See Judge & Cable, supra note 17, at 436. 
43  See id. 
44  See id. 
45  See id. 
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all men).46 One business expert has suggested that an additional four inches in 
height “make[s] much more difference in terms of success in a business career than 
any paper qualifications you have” and that it would be better to be “5 ft. 10 and a 
graduate of N.Y.U.’s business school than 5 ft. 6 and a Harvard Business School 
graduate.”47 Another commentator concluded that “being short is probably as 
much, or more, of a handicap to corporate success as being a woman or an African 
American.”48 
In sum, heightism tangibly affects employment decisions involving short 
employees. Because this type of discrimination is subtle, however, many who fall 
prey to it may not realize, or even think to realize, that it motivated decisions 
against them.49 Nevertheless, where victims of height discrimination suspect that 
adverse employment actions were motivated by their height, the question remains, 
what remedies are available under federal law? 
 
III.  HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND TITLE VII 
 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits employers from 
discriminating against applicants or employees because of their race, religion, 
national origin, color, or sex.50 An employer can violate Title VII under two basic 
theories. The first theory, disparate impact, involves “employment practices that 
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more 
harshly on one group than another.”51 This theory requires no showing of 
discriminatory motive.52 The second theory, disparate treatment, involves treating 
some less favorably than others because of their protected status.53 This theory 
necessarily requires a showing of discriminatory motive, be it express or implied.54 
                                                 
46  See GLADWELL, supra note 38, at 86–87. A 1980 survey showed that only 3 
percent of Fortune 500 CEOs were 5’7” or shorter. See Short Guys Finish Last, supra note 
12, at 20. 
47  Georgia Harbison, A Chance to Be Taller, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990, at 70. Moreover, 
CEOs would rather be bald than short. See Del Jones, The Bald Truth About CEOs; 
Executives Say They’d Rather Have No Hair Than Be Short, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 2008, 
at 1B.    
48  GLADWELL, supra note 38, at 87; see also Judge & Cable, supra note 17, at 438.  
49  This may explain why, in those jurisdictions explicitly protecting against height 
discrimination, so few cases have been brought. See infra notes 287–292 and 
accompanying text. 
50  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
51  Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005) (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977)). 
52  See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335–36 n.15. 
53  See id. 
54  See id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 
(1977)). 
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Under either theory, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case,55 which an 
employer can rebut by (1) defeating the inference of discrimination, in disparate 
treatment cases;56 (2) undermining the evidence of causation, in disparate impact 
cases;57 or (3) marshaling an affirmative defense.58 This Part, however, examines 
only how height fits into the prima facie case as a matter of law. The post-prima 
facie case inquiry is incredibly fact sensitive59 and therefore beyond the scope of 
this Article, which considers merely whether height-based claims are legally 
cognizable. 
To that end, this Part has two subsections. The first subsection analyzes 
claims brought under what one might call the “traditional” approaches, which have 
involved challenges to (1) facially neutral height restrictions under a disparate 
impact theory; (2) the uneven application of height restrictions as a pretext under a 
disparate treatment theory; and (3) height-based animus that has some 
demonstrable nexus to a protected trait under a disparate treatment theory. The 
second subsection suggests a new approach to height-based claims: challenging 
height-based disparate treatment as a form of impermissible gender stereotyping. 
                                                 
55  For a disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must show: “(1) membership in a 
protected group; (2) qualification for the job in question; (3) an adverse employment 
action, [i.e., a failure to hire, a failure to promote, or termination]; and (4) circumstances 
that support an inference of discrimination.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 
510 (2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Texas 
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253–54 n.6 (1981)). For a disparate 
impact theory, a plaintiff must show merely that a specific facially neutral employment 
practice negatively and disproportionately affects one group over another. See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 
(1988) (determining that a plaintiff must identify a specific employment practice). 
56  See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (“The burden then must shift to the 
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s 
rejection.”). 
57  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B) (2006); cf. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 
490 U.S. 642, 653 & n.8 (1989) (recognizing that an employer could rebut a disparate 
impact claim “if [the employer] could show that the percentage of selected applicants who 
are nonwhite is not significantly less than the percentage of qualified applicants who are 
nonwhite”); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977) (“We 
caution only that statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any 
other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted.”). 
58  For example, the employer could show in a disparate treatment case that religion, 
sex, or national origin (but not race or color) is a “bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). In disparate impact cases, the employer could show that the 
“challenged practice is job related for the position in question . . . consistent with business 
necessity,” id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), and that “there are [no] other ways for the employer 
to achieve its goals that do not result in a disparate impact on a protected class.” Smith v. 
City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005). 
59  Cf. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03 (“We need not attempt in the instant 
case to detail every manner which fairly could be recognized as a reasonable basis for a 
refusal to hire.”). 
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A.  The “Traditional” Approaches 
 
1.  Height Restrictions Under a Disparate Impact Theory 
 
As noted above, a disparate impact theory requires the plaintiff to point to a 
specific employment practice that adversely and disproportionately affects a 
protected group.60 This most commonly arises when an employer implements some 
sort of minimum height restriction. Such restrictions tend to adversely impact 
women and certain racial and ethnic groups. 
With respect to gender, in the seminal Dothard v. Rawlinson,61 an Alabama 
statute required that prison guards stand at least 5’2” and weigh 120 pounds.62 The 
Supreme Court found that the minimum height and weight restrictions violated 
Title VII because, when combined, they would exclude 41.13 percent of the female 
population while excluding less than 1 percent of the male population.63 
Conversely, in Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc.,64 a 6’7” white male 
plaintiff was rejected for employment as a truck driver because of the company’s 
6’4” maximum height limitation for the position.65 Livingston alleged reverse sex 
discrimination under Title VII because the restriction had a disparate impact on 
males.66 Statistical evidence showed that 0.9 percent of adult men were 6’4” or 
taller, whereas only 0.3 percent of women were 5’11” or taller; thus, the height 
maximum excluded three times as many men as women.67 Nevertheless, the Tenth 
Circuit rejected the reverse discrimination claim because it determined that “in 
impact cases, as in disparate treatment cases, a member of a favored group [like 
men] must show background circumstances supporting the inference that a facially 
neutral policy with a disparate impact is in fact a vehicle for unlawful 
discrimination,” which the plaintiff had failed to do.68 
Plaintiffs also have challenged minimum height restrictions for their disparate 
impact on people of certain races and national origins—namely, Asians and 
                                                 
60  See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
61  433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
62  Id. at 323–24. 
63  Id. at 329–31; cf. 28 C.F.R. § 50.14, pt.1 § 4(D) (2008) (“A selection rate for any 
race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate 
for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement 
agencies as evidence of adverse impact . . . .”). 
Another named plaintiff, a woman who applied for a position as a state trooper, 
successfully challenged the 5’9” height requirement and the 160-pound weight requirement 
for the position under the Equal Protection Clause. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 324 n.4. 
64  802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir. 1986). 
65  Id. at 1251. 
66  Id. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. at 1252–53. 
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Hispanics. In League of United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana,69 the 
City of Santa Ana imposed minimum height requirements for its police and fire 
departments.70 Although Mexican Americans constituted 25.8 percent of the city’s 
general population, they made up only 9.2 percent of the city’s police force and 4.5 
percent of its fire department.71 The district court found that the height 
requirements had served to deter Mexican American applicants,72 and disqualified 
two to three times as many Mexican American applicants as Caucasian 
applicants.73 Ultimately, the court determined “it [was] clear that by . . . the use of 
an arbitrary height requirement, the defendants were responsible for preventing 
substantial numbers of Mexican-Americans from taking the [qualification] tests in 
the first place.”74 
Likewise, in Sondel v. Northwest Airlines,75 a 4’11” woman of Sri Lankan 
descent76 applied for but was denied a position as a flight attendant and filed 
charges with the EEOC alleging that the airline’s height requirement discriminated 
against women, Asians, and Hispanics.77 The EEOC found that the airline’s 5’2” 
minimum height requirement did in fact exclude women, especially Hispanic and 
Asian women, from employment opportunities as flight attendants.78 And in 
Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission of the City and County of San 
Francisco,79 plaintiffs challenged the defendant commission’s use of a 5’6” 
preselection height minimum for patrol officers as discriminatory against Asians, 
Hispanics, and women.80 The district court agreed.81 
                                                 
69  410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976). 
70  Id. at 879. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. at 881. 
73  Id. at 882. 
74  Id. at 893. 
75  1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21436, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 1993) [hereinafter Sondel 
I]; see also Sondel v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21252, at *6 (D. Minn. 
Sept. 30, 1993) [hereinafter Sondel II]. 
76  Sondel II, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21252, at *2. In Sondel II, the Sondel I plaintiff 
joined forces with other rejected applicants to seek class certification, alleging 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, gender, and national origin. Sondel II, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21252, at *1. Among the other plaintiffs was Stephanie Chung, a 5’0” woman 
of Korean descent. Id. at *4. 
77  Sondel I, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21436, at *1–2. 
78  Sondel II, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21252, at *6–7. 
79  395 F. Supp. 378 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
80  Id. at 380. 
81  Id. In so finding, the district court did not even consider the general census data 
offered by the plaintiffs, which indicated that the average height of Asians and Hispanics 
was lower than that of African Americans or Caucasians, because the discriminatory 
impact “[was] clear from the height data on the applicants” themselves. Id. But see Arnold 
v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723, 727, 738 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (finding that the Akron Police 
Department’s minimum height requirement did not disqualify a disproportionate number of 
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2.  Height Restrictions as Pretext Under a Disparate Treatment Theory 
 
Some plaintiffs have successfully brought disparate treatment claims by 
showing that a facially neutral height restriction was a pretext for intentional 
discrimination where the employer applied the restriction unevenly to different 
groups. For example, in United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,82 a trucking 
company had instituted a 5’7” minimum height requirement for its drivers, which 
it strictly enforced against minority applicants;83 the company selectively enforced 
the height restriction for white applicants who did not meet the minimum.84 The 
court found that the selective application of the height restriction to minorities 
violated Title VII.85 
Similarly, in Schick v. Bronstein,86 the male plaintiff applied for a position as 
a patrolman in the New York City Police Department but was rejected because he 
failed to meet the 5’7” minimum height requirement in effect when he applied.87 
The police department also did not hire women as patrol officers when the plaintiff 
submitted his application.88 Shortly after he was rejected, the police department 
began hiring women as patrol officers and dropped the height requirement for all 
applicants.89 When the plaintiff reapplied for the job, however, the police 
department continued to apply the height restriction to him.90 The court determined 
that the department’s continued application of the height restriction to the plaintiff, 
when no such height requirement was applied to female applicants, “constituted a 
refusal of employment based on sex, in violation of Title VII.”91 
                                                                                                                            
African American applicants and was not “used to facilitate a discriminatory attitude 
against” African Americans). 
82  Civ. A. No. 72-445, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9670, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 
1980). 
83  Id. at *13, *20. 
84  Id. at *20. See also Chi. Fire Fighters Union Local No. 2 v. City of Chicago, Civ. 
A. Nos. 87-7295, 89-7984, 93-5438, 93-6175, 96-808, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20310, at 
*181 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 1999) (upholding city’s race-based affirmative action program for 
promotions within the fire department because a former fire commissioner had instituted 
pretextual job requirements—including minimum height requirements—to exclude 
minority applicants); McNamara v. City of Chicago, 959 F. Supp. 870, 875 (N.D. Ill. 1997) 
(same). 
85  See United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 924 (10th Cir. 
1979) (“The magnitude of the statistics established a prima facie case that during this 
period race was a factor in staffing the two driver categories.”). 
86  447 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
87  Id. at 334. 
88  Id. at 335. Women were hired as “policewomen,” an ostensibly different job, and 
were required to meet a 5’2” minimum height requirement. Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 338. See also U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 621(b)(1) (1991) [hereinafter “EEOC Interpretive Manual”]. 
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The same theory applies to height maximums. For example, in Laffey v. 
Northwest Airlines, Inc.,92 an airline did not hire women as flight attendants if they 
were taller than 5’9” but did hire men who were as tall as 6’0”.93 The court 
determined that the airline had violated Title VII by imposing a shorter maximum 
height requirement on women than it imposed on men.94 
 
3.  Height-Based Animus with a Demonstrable Nexus to a Protected Trait 
 
Many Title VII suits have challenged height-based animus as a pretext for 
intentional discrimination on the basis of some protected trait. Most of these cases 
have failed, however, because the plaintiffs could not establish a nexus between 
the alleged height-based animus and a trait protected by the statute; that is, they 
failed to establish the requisite inference of discriminatory motive. In Ekerman v. 
City of Chicago,95 for example, the plaintiff was a 4’10”, ninety-two-pound female 
detective in the Chicago Police Department who brought a Title VII claim alleging 
gender discrimination.96 She claimed that her work environment was unlawfully 
hostile because of a single, gender-neutral remark allegedly made by the deputy 
police chief, who “called out from behind her and said: ‘Boy are you short. How 
tall are you? How can you do this job?’”97 The district court granted summary 
judgment to the city, finding that Title VII did not generally prohibit height 
discrimination, that the statement was facially gender neutral, and that the plaintiff 
“offer[ed] no evidence to support a finding that the remark, despite being sex-
neutral on its face, was actually made on account of her gender.”98 
Similarly, in Cortez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,99 the plaintiff had been 
repeatedly denied promotions to the positions of general manager of a Sam’s Club 
and regional personnel manager at Walmart’s home office.100 He alleged that 
Walmart did not promote him on the basis of his age and race.101 The district court 
dismissed his race discrimination claim for lack of supporting evidence102 and 
found that, despite the fact that a regional vice president referred to him as 
“Shortez,” the record did not support his bare allegations of endemic managerial 
                                                 
92  366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973). 
93  Id. at 775. 
94  Id. at 790. 
95  Civ. A. No. 01-9686, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3775, at *1 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 12, 2003). 
96  Id. at *2, *8. 
97  Id. at *7. 
98  Id. at *8. The court also dismissed the plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Id. at *12–14. 
Although the plaintiff filed a report about the height-based comments, the court determined 
that filing such a report was not statutorily protected activity under Title VII because her 
subjective belief that the comments were motivated by sexual animus were unreasonable in 
the absence of proof of such animus. Id. at *10, *12. 
99  Civ. A. No. 03-1251, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43817, at *1 (D.N.M. Jan. 14, 2005). 
100  Id. at *6. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. at *17–18.  
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favoritism for “non-Hispanic” characteristics, such as above-average height.103 The 
district court in Pena v. USX Corp.104 reached a similar conclusion on comparable 
facts.105 
 
B.  A New Approach: Height as a Form of Gender Stereotyping 
 
Although these traditional approaches have proven moderately successful, 
they continue to underachieve because they fail to capture one of the most 
significant components of height discrimination: gender stereotyping. As this 
subsection shows, many cases of height-based animus, especially animus directed 
toward short men and tall women, result from gender stereotyping. 
 
1.  The Theory 
 
Height constitutes one of many significant factors that go into overall physical 
attractiveness, particularly for men, and “[i]t is almost axiomatic that short males 
are not attractive, or at least not as attractive as their taller counterparts.”106 After 
all, we often describe the quintessential man as “tall, dark, and handsome.”107 
Relative height preoccupies men, and short men typically struggle to form a sense 
of physical adequacy and competency.108 Women perceive short men as 
undesirable mates because they “do not strike [them] as true men.”109 Research 
plainly shows that “[t]he universally acknowledged cardinal rule of dating and 
mate selection is that the male will be significantly taller than his female 
partner”110 and that “women are actively selecting for tallness when they go 
looking for male partners.”111 
                                                 
103  Id. at *23 n.8. 
104  Civ. A. No. 03-334, 2006 WL 623598, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 9, 2006). 
105  Id. at *11 (“In addition, the court declines to expand the ban on racial 
discrimination articulated in [Title VII and § 1981] to include harassment based on height 
for no better reason than the plaintiff’s unsupported conclusion that in his coworkers’ eyes, 
Mexicans were short and therefore all harassment based on height was racially 
motivated.”). 
106  MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 5. 
107  Id. (observing that Ms. Magazine ran an article entitled “Short, Dark and Almost 
Handsome”). 
108  Id.  
109  Id. at 25 (citing H.G. Beigel, Body Height in Mate Selection, 29 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 
257, 268 (1954)). For example, when 100 women of all heights between ages 18 and 22 
were shown pictures of men whom they believed to be either short, average, or tall, all of 
the women found the tall men to be significantly more attractive than the short men. See id. 
at 26. 
110  Id. 
111  BBC News, Tall Guys Get the Girls (Jan. 13, 2000), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ 
hi/sci/tech/600481.stm. 
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More importantly, however, “large body size has a symbolic meaning to 
males that is unique to their gender.”112 Put simply, we (both males and females) 
view large men as more manly.113 As such, short men struggle to negotiate and 
solidify positive male identity.114 Because we value bigness in men—in part 
because much of the normative male gender role involves offering security to self 
and others, which we assume smaller men are less capable (or even incapable) of 
providing—shortness in males manifests a failure to satisfy the norm.115 
Conversely, because women are generally shorter than men and desire to be 
small,116 a tall woman may be perceived as defying her gender norm because of her 
uncharacteristic stature.117 Consider that endocrinologists in the 1950s prescribed 
hormones as growth suppressants for tall girls.118 Data collected in 1978 showed 
that up to one half of pediatric endocrinologists had offered estrogen to young 
women whose adult height they forecast to be greater than 6’1”.119 More recent 
data suggest this practice is out of fashion, although one in five pediatric 
endocrinologists had reported treating at least one girl for “tall stature” within the 
past five years.120 
Gender stereotyping theories of liability under Title VII have become 
increasingly popular and effective in recent years. Beginning in Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins,121 the Supreme Court held that, “[i]n the specific context of sex 
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be 
                                                 
112  MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 6. The preference for male height spans every 
culture. See id. at 33 (citing C.S. FORD & F.A. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 
(1951)). The preference for female body type is less consistent cross-culturally. Id. 
113  Id. at 6 (citing SEYMOUR FISHER, BODY CONSCIOUSNESS: YOU ARE WHAT YOU 
FEEL 119 (1973)). 
114  Id. at 6. 
115  Id. at 8. “[T]he male whose body type does not conform to the traditional image of 
the ideal male, that of the tall mesomorph, may face severe difficulty in accepting himself 
and having others accept him as truly masculine and competent in the male role.” Id. at 32 
(quoting A. Gascaly & C.A. Borges, The Male Physique and Behavioral Experience 
Expectancies, 106 J. PSYCHOL. 97, 101 (1979)). 
116  See MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 5 (citing G. Calden et al., Sex Differences 
in Body Concepts, 23 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 378 (1959)). 
117  See id. (“Femininity is often associated with petiteness and, at the very least, being 
large is seen as unfeminine whether it is being very tall or overweight.”); see also E. 
Brecher, Will Perot Be The Short-Cut Chief, or Just Cut Short?, COURIER-MAIL, June 11, 
1992 (“[S]tudies have shown that bosses often reject tall women because they’re too 
threatening.”). 
118  See ELLIOTT, supra note 26, at 242. 
119  Id. (citing F.A. Conte & M.M. Grumbach, Estrogen Use in Children and 
Adolescents: A Survey, 62 PEDIATRICS 1091 (1978)). 
120  Id. (citing Neal D. Barnard et al., The Current Use of Estrogens for Growth-
Suppressant Therapy in Adolescent Girls, 15 J. PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 
23, 23–26 (2002)). 
121  490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
2009] HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 923 
 
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”122 The 
plaintiff, a senior manager for the defendant consulting firm, was passed over for 
partnership because, despite exhibiting desirable traits such as “strong character, 
independence and integrity,”123 she just did not act “like a woman should.”124 The 
Court concluded that “[a]n employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but 
whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible 
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. 
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”125 Subsequently, in Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, Inc.,126 a unanimous Supreme Court recognized that there could 
be no absolute presumption under Title VII that a person of one gender would not 
discriminate against another person of the same gender.127 As such, the Court 
determined that actionable sexual harassment “need not be motivated only by 
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination . . . .”128 
Victims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have successfully 
used this gender-stereotyping theory—despite the fact that sexual orientation is not 
protected under Title VII129—to challenge workplace harassment under Title VII. 
Before Price Waterhouse and Oncale, however, same-sex harassment claims 
                                                 
122  Id. at 250. 
123  Id. at 234. 
124  See id. at 235 (“[S]ome of the partners reacted negatively to Hopkins’ personality 
because she was a woman. One partner described her as ‘macho’; another suggested that 
she ‘overcompensated for being a woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm 
school.’ Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner suggested 
that those partners objected to her swearing only ‘because it’s a lady using foul language.’ 
Another supporter explained that Hopkins ‘ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat 
masculine hard-nosed mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady 
ptr candidate.’”). 
125  Id. at 251. The Court further noted that “we are beyond the day when an employer 
could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype 
associated with their group, for ‘in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals 
because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” Id. (emphasis added) 
(quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) (some 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
126  523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
127  Id. at 78. 
128  Id. at 80. 
129  See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Further, 
this court has explicitly declined to extend Title VII protections to discrimination based on 
a person’s sexual orientation.” (citing Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 
1135 (10th Cir. 2005))); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[S]exual orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts under Title VII.”); 
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260–61 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); 
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The law is well-settled in this circuit 
and in all others to have reached the question that . . . Title VII does not prohibit 
harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation.”). 
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typically failed at the motion to dismiss stage. In Smith v. Liberty Mutual,130 for 
example, the plaintiff applied for a position as a mailroom clerk with the defendant 
employer, but was not hired because the interviewing supervisor thought his 
behavior was “effeminate.”131 The Fifth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s gender 
discrimination claim because he failed to allege that he was discriminated against 
“because he was a male.”132 Instead, the plaintiff alleged discrimination because 
“as a male, he was thought to have those attributes more generally characteristic of 
females and epitomized in the descriptive ‘effeminate’.”133 The court determined 
that, because Title VII did not forbid discrimination on sexual preference, it did not 
prohibit the conduct alleged.134 The Ninth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in 
DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.135 
In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,136 however, the Ninth 
Circuit overruled DeSantis in light of Price Waterhouse and Oncale.137 The 
Nichols court found that “the systematic abuse directed at [the plaintiff],”138 which 
“reflected a belief that [he] did not act as a man should act . . . [,] was closely 
linked to gender”139 and thus in violation of Title VII.140 Likewise, in Bibby v. 
Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co.,141 the Third Circuit recognized that a 
plaintiff could prove same-sex harassment “was discrimination because of sex” 
using a gender stereotype theory,142 citing to similar holdings in the First, Second, 
and Seventh Circuits.143 
                                                 
130  569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978). 
131  Id. at 326. 
132  Id. at 327. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 326–27 (citing Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th 
Cir. 1975) (en banc)). 
135  608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979). 
136  256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
137  Id. at 874–75. 
138  Id. at 874. Specifically, “[m]ale co-workers and a supervisor repeatedly referred to 
[the plaintiff] in Spanish and English as ‘she’ and ‘her.’ Male co-workers mocked [him] for 
walking and carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman,’ and taunted him in Spanish and 
English as, among other things, a ‘faggot’ and a ‘fucking female whore.’” Id. at 870. 
139  Id. at 874. 
140  Id. at 875. 
141  260 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2001). 
142  Id. at 262–64. However, the Bibby plaintiff failed to prove this theory because “he 
did not claim that he was harassed because he failed to comply with societal stereotypes of 
how men ought to appear or behave.” Id. at 264. 
143  Id. at 263; see also Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(upholding the district court’s dismissal of a same-sex harassment claim where plaintiff’s 
co-workers “repeatedly assaulted him with such comments as ‘go fuck yourself, fag,’ ‘suck 
my dick,’ and ‘so you like it up the ass?’”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 
194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) (denying same-sex harassment claim on appeal because, 
despite evidence that co-workers mocked plaintiff’s supposedly effeminate characteristics, 
plaintiff presented that evidence to the district court only as an example of discrimination 
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Turning back to height, discrimination against a short man because he is short 
is, in effect, discrimination against him because his short stature manifests his 
failure to satisfy the male gender norm, i.e., because he is less manly than he ought 
to be. Likewise, discrimination against a tall woman because of her tall stature can 
be premised on an impermissible gender stereotype. Such discrimination would 
arguably fall within the contours of Title VII’s prohibition against gender-based 
discrimination. 
 
2.  The Approach 
 
Although pervasive, height discrimination in the workplace is often latent, 
manifesting predominantly either in failures to hire or promote, or in disparate 
wages. As a result, the “traditional” approaches tend to break down: the disparate 
impact claim approach underachieves because, in many cases, employers will not 
have an express policy of height discrimination in hiring, promotion, or wages; 
and, the individual disparate treatment approach typically fails because discrete 
instances of height-based animus have proved hard to connect to a protected 
trait.144 
There remains a third theory, however, that combines elements of both the 
individual disparate treatment and disparate impact theories and which responds 
nicely to the frailties of both theories in the context of height discrimination—
namely, a systemic disparate treatment (or “pattern or practice”) theory. A 
systemic disparate treatment theory still requires a showing of discriminatory 
intent in order to succeed,145 but it permits an inference of such intent from a 
pattern of adverse outcomes or “bad stats.”146 Plaintiffs can prevail under such a 
theory if they can “prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or ‘accidental’ 
or sporadic discriminatory acts”—that is, that discrimination was the employer’s 
“standard operating procedure.”147 Put into context, a height discrimination 
plaintiff could establish impermissible gender stereotyping predicated on height by 
showing a pattern of adverse employment actions that disproportionately affect a 
protected group.148 For example, while a short man might struggle to connect his 
                                                                                                                            
because of sexual orientation); Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 582–83 (7th Cir. 
1997) (finding “nothing wrong with [the] theory” that harassment can be classified as 
gender-based when supported by evidence that one’s co-workers believe “that an earring is 
a feminine accouterment not suitable for male adornment”). 
144  See supra notes 95–105 and accompanying text. 
145  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). 
146  See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace 
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 976 (2005) (“Systemic disparate treatment claims 
can focus on the total results of an employer’s hiring practices and sometimes infer 
discriminatory purpose from ‘bad stats . . . .’”). 
147  Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336. 
148  Cf. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 469 (2001) (“[B]ehavior that appears gender neutral, 
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lower wages to invidious height discrimination when considered in isolation, he 
might have greater success by showing that all short men working for the employer 
receive lower wages than their similarly qualified, taller counterparts. 
The EEOC typically brings systemic disparate treatment cases, but private 
plaintiffs may bring the functional equivalent of such cases in the form of Rule 23 
class actions.149 Although these actions typically are not well-suited to address 
uniquely individualized forms of discrimination, such as disability discrimination 
under the ADA,150 plaintiffs have successfully brought systemic disparate 
treatment actions challenging sexual harassment151 and gender stereotyping under 
Title VII.152 In Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,153 for example, the class alleged 
that Wal-Mart discriminated against female employees by delegating unfettered 
decision-making authority to lower-level supervisors and managers, which resulted 
in lower wages and fewer or slower promotions for female workers.154 To support 
their claim, the Dukes plaintiffs presented evidence, both anecdotal and expert, that 
Wal-Mart corporate culture placed a strong emphasis on building and maintaining 
a uniform culture and fostered an environment that perpetuated gender 
stereotyping.155 Similar class lawsuits have challenged the delegation of unfettered 
decision-making authority that promotes stereotypes and, in turn, limits 
opportunities for women or minorities.156 
Although a systemic theory of liability (either disparate impact or systemic 
disparate treatment) seems best suited for height-based claims, plaintiffs 
proceeding under a systemic disparate treatment theory are more likely to succeed 
if they can supplement their statistical evidence with direct evidence of 
                                                                                                                            
when considered in isolation, may actually produce gender bias when connected to broader 
exclusionary patterns.”). 
149  See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 214 (6th ed. 2003); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
150  See Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 480 (1999) (observing that “the 
determination of whether an individual is [disabled] must be made on a case by case 
basis”); see also Michael A. Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, 
and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 864 (2006) (noting that “the class action device, 
which historically played a central role in group-based discrimination theory (while often 
going hand in hand with robust disparate impact litigation), has been virtually nonexistent 
under the [ADA’s] employment provisions”). 
151  See generally EEOC v. Dial Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 926, 946 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 
(listing cases in which the courts recognized “the ability of plaintiffs, including the EEOC, 
to proceed on a pattern-or-practice theory in litigating claims of systemic employment 
discrimination, including sexual harassment”). 
152  See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
153  Id. 
154  Id. at 141, 152–53. 
155  Id. at 151, 153–54. 
156  See, e.g., Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 632–34 (N.D. Cal. 
2007); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., Civ. A. No. 94-4335, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3370, at 
*1, *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1996); see also Melissa Hart, Learning from Wal-Mart, 10 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 355, 372 (2006).  
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discrimination.157 Courts are generally reluctant to infer discrimination from mere 
statistics without anecdotal evidence of discriminatory motive.158 
 
IV.  HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT  
 
Height-based discrimination claims may also prove viable under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).159 The ADA generally prohibits 
discrimination “because of” one’s disability.160 Just like Title VII plaintiffs, an 
ADA plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case under either a disparate 
treatment theory or a disparate impact theory.161 Under either theory, however, the 
first and typically fatal hurdle has been establishing one’s “disability.”162 
The ADA defines disability, in part, as “a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual” or 
                                                 
157  Cf. Miller, supra note 9, at 264–65 (“[W]here available, statistics may 
demonstrate the discriminatory effect of a company’s hiring, assignment and promotion 
policies on minorities. . . . The low percentage of little people in the labor market makes it 
extremely difficult to obtain any meaningful statistical evidence about little people. Since 
no meaningful percentage of little people are concentrated in any particular labor area, 
researchers must examine a diverse group of industries to describe hiring and promotion 
practices affecting dwarfs.”). 
158  See Tracy A. Baron, Comment, Keeping Women Out of the Executive Suite: The 
Courts’ Failure to Apply Title VII Scrutiny to Upper-Level Jobs, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 267, 
288 (1994) (“In systemic disparate treatment cases, courts often refuse to infer 
discrimination solely from a pattern of exclusion demonstrated by statistics, and instead 
insist on anecdotal evidence of discriminatory motive.”). 
159  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12300 (2006). Additionally, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
applies the same standards to discrimination in any program or activity that receives federal 
assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); see also Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 
534 U.S. 184, 193 (2002) (“Congress drew the ADA’s definition of disability almost 
verbatim from the definition of ‘handicapped individual’ in the Rehabilitation Act.”). 
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 705(20) (2006) (defining “individual with a disability” under the 
Rehabilitation Act) with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006) (defining “disability” with respect to 
an individual under the ADA). 
160  See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) (prohibiting disability discrimination in the 
workplace); id. § 12132 (prohibiting discrimination in the enjoyment of public services, 
programs, or activities); id. § 12182 (prohibiting same in the enjoyment of public 
accommodations). 
161  See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49 n.3 (2003) (observing that the 
courts of appeals have applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in ADA cases); id. at 53 
(recognizing that “[b]oth disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims are cognizable 
under the ADA”). 
162  See Sullivan, supra note 146, at 942 & n.123 (discussing a 2003 study that found 
only 2 percent of ADA cases were won by employee plaintiffs and that barely half made it 
to consideration on their merits); see generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-325 §§ 2(a), (b), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554 (2008) [hereinafter “ADAAA”] (expressing 
dismay that Supreme Court decisions construed the ADA too narrowly thereby eliminating 
protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect). 
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“being regarded as having such an impairment.”163 This section examines how 
short stature fits (or does not fit) within each of these definitions. The first part 
looks at height-based claims under an “actual impairment” theory. Although most 
courts have wholly rejected “actual impairment” claims premised on short stature, 
a fresh look at the regulatory scheme in light of the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008 (“ADAAA”) suggests that such claims may have merit after all. The second 
part considers height-based claims under the “regarded as” prong. Although 
“regarded as” claims premised on height have largely failed, such claims may 
prove increasingly viable after the enactment of the ADAAA. 
 
A.  “Actual Impairment” 
 
1.  Statutory and Regulatory Framework 
 
To be protected under the ADA’s “actual impairment” prong, a plaintiff must 
establish (1) that he or she suffers from a physical or mental impairment (2) that 
substantially limits a major life activity.164 The Supreme Court summarily 
observed in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,165 that “an employer is free [under the 
ADA] to decide that physical characteristics . . . that do not rise to the level of an 
impairment—such as a one’s height, build, or singing voice—are preferable to 
others.”166 But what actually constitutes a physical impairment? The EEOC has 
promulgated regulations interpreting the ADA’s statutory language, defining 
physical impairment as “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic 
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body 
systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory 
(including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, 
hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine . . . .”167 
The EEOC has further clarified that “‘impairment’ does not include physical 
characteristics such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or 
muscle tone that are within ‘normal’ range and are not the result of a 
physiological disorder.”168 A plain reading of this language would suggest that the 
definition of “physical impairment” includes either (1) a normal deviation in height 
that is the product of a physiological disorder, or (2) an extreme deviation in height 
that may or may not be caused by a physiological disorder.169 
                                                 
163  42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A), (C) (2006). The ADA also defines disability in a third 
way, i.e., if a person has a record of impairment. Id. § 12102(2)(B). This definition of 
disability, however, adds little to the discussion of height under the ADA and is therefore 
omitted. 
164  See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006). 
165  527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
166  Id. at 490 (emphasis added). 
167  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2008). 
168  29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h) (2008) (emphasis added). 
169  See EEOC Interpretive Manual, supra note 91, § 902.2(c)(5) (“[N]ormal 
deviations in height, weight, or strength that are not the result of a physiological disorder 
2009] HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 929 
 
Many federal courts have not read the regulations this expansively, finding 
that short stature does not constitute an impairment and, thus, is not protected 
under the ADA. As this part demonstrates, however, these courts have too 
narrowly construed the statute and regulations, particularly in light of the 
ADAAA’s renewed commitment to expanding protections against disability 
discrimination. Extreme deviations in height may qualify as impairments and, in 
some cases, rise to the level of disability even in the absence of an underlying 
physiological disorder. 
 
2.  Extreme Short Stature Constitutes an Impairment 
 
(a)  “Just Plain Short” 
 
As noted above, a plain reading of the EEOC’s interpretive guidance suggests 
that height can qualify as an impairment in one of two ways: (1) if a physiological 
disorder causes a normal deviation in height; or (2) if one suffers from an extreme 
deviation in height (i.e., outside the “normal range”), whether or not it is the result 
of a physiological disorder.170 This section focuses on the second possible reading 
because most cases of short stature are not the result of a physiological disorder. 
Short stature has myriad causes. Some causes are environmental, such as 
trauma, radiation, and malnutrition.171 Some causes are medical, including growth 
hormone deficiency (e.g., hypopituitary dwarfism),172 congenital diseases (e.g., 
Turner syndrome),173 illness (e.g., chronic renal insufficiency),174 and skeletal 
dysplasias (e.g., achondroplasia and diastrophic displasia).175 However, medical 
causes account for only about 5 percent of short stature cases,176 which is to say 
that most short people suffer from no biological malfunction at all.177 
                                                                                                                            
are not impairments. . . . At extremes, however, such deviations may constitute 
impairments.” (internal citations omitted)). 
170  See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text. 
171  See Fox, supra note 24, at 1144. 
172  See id. at 1144 & n.43; Mary Lee Vance & Nelly Mauras, Growth Hormone 
Therapy in Adults and Children, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1206, 1211 (1999); BETTY M. 
ADELSON, DWARFISM: MEDICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL ASPECTS OF PROFOUND SHORT 
STATURE 28–31 (2005). 
173  See Vance & Mauras, supra note 172, at 1211; Fox, supra note 24, at 1144. 
174  See Vance & Mauras, supra note 172, at 1211–12; Fox, supra note 24, at 1144. 
175  See Vance & Mauras, supra note 172, at 1213; ADELSON, supra note 172, at 17–
18. 
176  See Fox, supra note 24, at 1144 (citing Raymond L. Hintz, Disorders of Growth, 
in HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 128 (Kurt J. Isselbacher et al. eds., 
1994)). 
177  See id. (citing Larry R. Churchill, Bias, Opportunity, and Justice in Growth 
Hormone Therapy, in GROWTH, STATURE, AND ADAPTATION: BEHAVIORAL, SOCIAL, AND 
COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF GROWTH DELAY 195, 195 (Brian Stabler & Louis E. Underwood 
eds., 1994)); see also MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 1 (“More than half of very short 
individuals have no apparent endocrinological or biological abnormality.”). 
930 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
The remaining short people comprise a “heterogeneous group of otherwise 
apparently normal [people] who are at or below the 5th percentile for height” but 
who respond normally to growth hormone.178 This group includes those classified 
as having genetic short stature, normal-variant familial short stature (if they have 
short parents), constitutional delay of growth (if they experience a delay in skeletal 
maturation), or idiopathic short stature (in the absence of any other diagnosable 
cause).179 Courts have already recognized that short stature resulting from a variety 
of the aforementioned medical causes, notably achondroplasia and diastrophic 
dysplasia, qualifies as an impairment.180 Those who are just plain short, however, 
have had virtually no success bringing pure height-based claims under the “actual 
impairment” prong. 
In Mehr v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.,181 for example, the 
4’10” female plaintiff filed EEOC charges alleging, inter alia, discrimination for 
“being short.”182 She later recharacterized her action as an ADA claim, asserting 
short stature as an impairment.183 The Sixth Circuit denied her claim as meritless 
because it interpreted the regulations as excluding from the definition of 
“impairment” all “physical characteristics that are ‘not the result of a physiological 
disorder.’”184 
                                                 
178  Vance & Mauras, supra note 172, at 1212. 
179  Id. Idiopathic short stature is, in effect, a diagnosis of exclusion because it merely 
rules out all other systemic, genetic, syndromic, organic, or psychosocial causes. See Mary 
M. Lee, Idiopathic Short Stature, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2576, 2576 (2006). 
180  See Roloff v. SAP Am., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114 (D. Or. 2006) (“It is 
undisputed that plaintiff, who has ‘dyrostrophic dwarfism,’ is disabled.”); Dexler v. Tisch, 
660 F. Supp. 1418, 1425 (D. Conn. 1987) (finding man who suffered from achondroplastic 
dwarfism qualified for protection under the Rehabilitation Act). The plaintiff in Roloff, 
despite losing on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, currently stars in TLC’s 
reality show “Little People Big World.” See TLC.com, Meet Matt Roloff, 
http://tlc.discovery.com/fansites/lpbw/bios/matt.html (last accessed December 2, 2008). 
181  72 F. App’x. 276 (6th Cir. 2003). 
182  Id. at 286. 
183  Id. at 287. 
184  Id. (quoting Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1997)). Andrews 
involved claims that obesity and lack of cardiovascular endurance qualified as 
impairments. Andrews, 104 F.3d at 805–06. The Sixth Circuit rejected the claims, 
perfunctorily reading 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) to exclude from the definition of impairment 
all physical characteristics not resulting from physiological disorders. See id. at 808. The 
court justified that “[t]o hold otherwise would . . . distort the ‘concept of an impairment 
[which] implies a characteristic that is not commonplace’ and would thereby ‘debase [the] 
high purpose [of] the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped.’” Id. at 810 
(emphasis added). 
The Andrews court, however, did not consider the “normal range” reading of the 
regulation discussed above, instead relying on its prior holding in Jasany v. United States 
Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985), which determined that 
“‘[c]haracteristics such as average height or strength that render an individual incapable of 
performing particular jobs are not covered by the statute because they are not 
impairments’” under the Rehabilitation Act. Andrews, 104 F.3d at 810 (quoting Jasany, 
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Similarly, in Gowins v. Greiner,185 the plaintiff was a 6’5”, wheelchair-
confined inmate who sued under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act because he 
was not provided with a bed that suitably accommodated his height and 
disability.186 The plaintiff conceded that the inadequacy of the bed derived 
primarily from his height, which caused his feet to dangle over the edge of the 
bed.187 The district court rejected his ADA claim, declaring that “a person’s height 
is not ordinarily an ‘impairment’ covered as a disability by the Rehabilitation Act 
or the ADA” and finding that physical characteristics, such as height, that are not 
the result of a physiological disorder do not qualify as impairments.188 
Why have these claims failed? In part, it may be because many of them, 
including Mehr and Gowins, have been litigated by pro se plaintiffs.189 More 
likely, it is because the courts considering such claims have considered only one 
possible reading of the regulation. Despite the regulation’s plain language, and 
notwithstanding the EEOC’s recognition that “[a]t extremes . . . deviations [in 
height] may constitute impairments,”190 federal courts have not considered this 
theory in deciding height-based claims under the ADA.191 
 
(b)  “Within ‘Normal Range’” 
 
Even if federal courts had applied an “extreme deviation in height” gloss to 
the regulation, they would have been left without much guidance on just how 
extreme a deviation in height must be to qualify as an impairment—this in spite of 
the EEOC’s efforts to provide such guidance. To clarify what constitutes an 
extreme deviation in height, the EEOC Interpretive Manual offers two examples. 
The first example, which the EEOC suggests does not qualify under the ADA, 
involves a 4’10” woman192 denied a job as a factory worker because the employer 
                                                                                                                            
755 F.2d at 1249 (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, Jasany adopted this standard out of 
whole cloth. See Jasany, 755 F.2d at 1249 & n.4. Thus, Mehr serves as a good example of 
how courts have perpetuated incomplete (and therefore improper) standards for considering 
height as a qualifying impairment; other courts have relied on Andrews to dismiss height-
based disability claims. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
185  Civ. A. No. 01-6933, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14098, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 
2002). 
186  Id. at *4–5, *31. 
187  Id. at *31. 
188  Id. at *32 (quoting Andrews v. Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 808 (6th Cir. 1997)).  
189  The plaintiffs in Reiterman v. Costco Wholesale Management # 238, Civ. A. No. 
05-12, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15219, *1 (W.D. Va. July 28, 2005), and Mullett v. 
American Cargo, Inc., Civ. A. No. 03-608, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24245, *1 (N.D. Ind. 
Oct. 19, 2005), likewise proceeded pro se and lost. See infra notes 245–249 and 
accompanying text. 
190  EEOC Interpretive Manual, supra note 91, § 902.2(c)(5). 
191  See supra note 184. 
192  A height of 4’10” puts a woman below the third percentile for height. See supra 
Table 4; see also Fox, supra note 24, at 1143 (noting that “[a] short-statured adult female 
may be as tall as 4 feet 11.1 inches . . .”). 
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thought her too small to do the job.193 Despite her below-average height, the EEOC 
says that “her small stature [is] not so extreme as to constitute an impairment . . . 
.”194 The second example, which the EEOC finds does qualify under the ADA, 
involves a 4’5” man suffering from achondroplastic dwarfism.195 Unfortunately, 
neither of these examples actually clarifies what falls outside “normal range.” 
 
(i)  Why the EEOC’s Interpretive Examples Provide No Guidance  
 
The second of the EEOC’s examples is entirely inapposite to cases that do not 
involve medically-caused short stature because the plaintiff in that example clearly 
suffers from an underlying physiological disorder.196 Thus, the plaintiff in the 
example would qualify for protection even under the more limited reading of the 
regulation that many courts have applied to height-based cases. The first example, 
moreover, although superficially helpful, is deficient for two reasons: (1) it speaks 
in terms of nominal height rather than relative height (i.e., in inches, not 
percentiles), which is most appropriate when discussing the “normal range”; and 
(2) it is based substantially on American Motors Corp. v. Labor & Industry Review 
Commission,197 which, for several reasons discussed below, cannot inform 
impairment determinations under the ADA. 
In American Motors, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered under the 
state’s Fair Employment Act the discrimination claims of a 4’10”-tall woman who 
had been denied a job as a factory worker allegedly because of her short stature.198 
Under the Wisconsin law, the plaintiff had to first establish that she was 
“handicapped within the meaning of the Act.”199 The statute at that time, however, 
did not define “handicap.”200 Rather, the Wisconsin courts had defined “handicap” 
by its common usage to include “‘such diseases . . . which make achievement 
unusually difficult’”201 or which “limit[] the capacity to work.”202 
Relying on this definition of “handicap,” the American Motors court held that 
“a handicap within the meaning of the Act is a physical or mental condition that 
                                                 
193  See EEOC Interpretive Manual, supra note 91, § 902.2(c)(5)(i). 
194  Id. (citing Am. Motors Corp. v. Wisc. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 350 
N.W.2d 120 (Wis. 1984)). 
195  Id. § 902.2(c)(5)(1) (citing Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1425 (D. Conn. 
1987)). 
196  See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
197  350 N.W.2d 120 (Wis. 1984). 
198  Id. at 121. 
199  Id. at 122.  
200  Id. at 122–23. Wisconsin has since redubbed “handicap” as “impairment” and 
codified the definition. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8)(a) (West 2002). 
201  Am. Motors, 350 N.W.2d. at 122–23 (quoting Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. 
R.R. Co. v. Wis. Dep’t Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 215 N.W.2d 443, 446 (Wis. 
1974)). 
202  Id. at 123 (discussing Dairy Equip. Co. v. Dep’t Indus. & Human Relations, 290 
N.W.2d 330 (Wis. 1980)). 
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imposes limitations on a person’s ability to achieve and capacity to work beyond 
the normal limitations that might render a person unable to make certain 
achievements or perform every possible job.”203 Although the court determined 
that “[a]ll persons have some mental or physical deviations from the norm,” the 
court rightly held that “such inherent limitations or deviations . . . do not 
automatically constitute handicaps.”204 The court concluded, however, that the 
plaintiff’s height “[did] not constitute such a significant deviation from the norm 
that it [made] achievement unusually difficult” because—although the plaintiff 
was below the norm for height and faced “some limitations on her general ability 
to achieve and work, a person with her stature [remained] capable of a wide range 
of achievements, including many that a taller and heavier person could not do.”205 
The EEOC’s continued reliance on American Motors for guidance is 
problematic for several reasons. First, the decision deals exclusively with 
Wisconsin state law. Moreover, the case was decided over a decade after the 
enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which internally defined “disability,” 
as does the ADA, as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities.”206 Thus, it is significant that Wisconsin’s Fair 
Employment Act defined handicap and impairment differently from then-existing 
federal law because it suggests that the Wisconsin law was meant to apply 
independently of the federal law and its definitions.207 
Second, the American Motors court never discretely considered whether the 
plaintiff’s height was itself an impairment.208 Rather, the court approached the 
inquiry such that, in effect, it conflated the factual determination of whether the 
plaintiff was impaired with the legal determination of whether she was 
“handicapped” (and thus eligible for protection under the Act). The Wisconsin 
                                                 
203  Id.  
204  Id. at 124. 
205  Id. 
206  See 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (2006). 
207  See Am. Motors, 350 N.W.2d at 122 n.3 (observing that the subsequent 
amendments to the Wisconsin law incorporated the definition of handicap contained in the 
federal Rehabilitation Act, but that “[b]ecause there [was] no indication that the legislature 
intended a retroactive application of this statute, the provisions of the Act in effect at the 
time Basile filed her amended complaint apply in [the] case”); cf. King v. City of Madison, 
Civ. A. No. 07-295, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25793, at *2–3 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 28, 2008) 
(“Unfortunately for plaintiff, a state administrative law judge’s determination under 
[Wisconsin’s Fair Employment Act] has no bearing on a federal court’s determination of 
disability under federal law.”); Jane M. Nold, Hidden Handicaps: Protection of Alcoholics, 
Drug Addicts, and the Mentally Ill Against Employment Discrimination Under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 
725, 732–35 (describing the differences between the Wisconsin FEA and the Rehabilitation 
Act). 
208  See Miller, supra note 9, at 247 (observing that the plaintiff’s lawyers “stressed 
her ability to perform the job’s tasks, down-playing any evidence of physical impairment,” 
a strategy that “excluded arguments which addressed the classification of stature as a 
handicap”). 
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courts now bifurcate this analysis to parallel the ADA analysis, considering first 
whether a person has an impairment and then determining whether that impairment 
makes “achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to work.”209 
Finally, American Motors relied on the Fair Employment Act’s definition of 
disability—limited in its application exclusively to the employment context—
which rendered impairments protected only if they “impose[d] limitations on a 
person’s ability to achieve and capacity to work beyond the normal limitations that 
might render a person unable to make certain achievements or perform every 
possible job.”210 The ADA, however, considers whether an impairment 
“substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities,”211 which encompasses 
far more than just working.212 After all, the ADA extends well beyond the 
employment context.213 Thus, the determination by the American Motors court that 
the plaintiff was not disabled because she could still work would not presently 
preclude a finding that a 4’10”-tall woman is “disabled” under the ADA if her 
impairment substantially limited a life activity other than working. The ADAAA 
has since codified a non-exhaustive list of such life activities.214 
In sum, although the EEOC has tried to clarify what constitutes outside the 
“normal range” for height, its purported guidance provides little guidance at all. In 
the absence of such agency insight, the question remains how to determine when a 
person’s short stature is sufficiently extreme to qualify as an impairment under the 
federal statute. 
 
(ii)  What Should Be Considered “Within Normal Range” 
 
To determine what is within normal range for height, one might look for 
guidance to similar regulations governing weight. However, the weight-based 
regulations prove largely unhelpful for a variety of reasons, most notably that few 
if any pure weight-based discrimination claims are brought under the ADA.215 
Rather, overweight ADA plaintiffs typically allege discrimination on the basis of 
                                                 
209  See, e.g., Hutchinson Tech., Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 682 N.W.2d 
343, 346–37 n.4 (Wis. 2004) (quoting WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.32(8)). 
210  Am. Motors, 350 N.W.2d at 124 (emphasis added). 
211  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006). 
212  See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008) (defining “major life activities” to include 
“caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, 
breathing, learning, and working”); see also ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3(2), 122 
Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008) (codifying a non-exhaustive list of “major life activities”). 
213  The ADA also applies to public services, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2006), 
and public accommodations. See id. §§ 12181–12189 (2006). 
214  See ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 3(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008) (codifying 
a non-exhaustive list of “major life activities”). 
215  But pure weight requirements have been challenged under Title VII for their 
disparate impact on certain groups, such as women. See generally EEOC Interpretive 
Manual, supra note 91, §§ 621.4–621.5 (discussing how weight requirements give rise to 
disparate impact and disparate treatment claims under Title VII). 
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their obesity.216 To qualify as an impairment, a person’s weight must actually 
constitute “severe” or “morbid” obesity, i.e., it must be 100 percent over that 
person’s medically ideal weight.217 This measurement, however, is relative to a 
nominal value (normal height for one’s ideal weight), without reference to the 
frequency with which that value occurs in the population. And what constitutes 
normal or abnormal weight depends on not just how heavy one is, but how heavy 
one is compared with how tall one is.218 To put it simply, there theoretically could 
be an unlimited number of obese people if everyone weighed twice as much as he 
or she should,219 while there could never be an unlimited number of short people 
because some will always be taller or shorter than others.220 Thus, because mere 
weight as a characteristic is not protected under the ADA, and because obesity is 
not truly examined for statistical “normalcy” within the population, the definition 
of obesity does little to inform the determination of “normal range” for height. 
The most logical remaining option for determining “normal range” would be 
to look to statistical principles, namely standard deviation.221 Standard deviation, 
as a “descriptive statistic,”222 measures “the typical or expected variation of the 
                                                 
216  See, e.g., Cook v. R.I. Dep’t. Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 
20 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1260 
(11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 438 (6th 
Cir. 2006); Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1997); Fredregill v. 
Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 1997); Walton v. 
Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa, Civ. A. No. 96-5682, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18224, at *44 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1997); EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 971 (S.D. Tex. 
1996); cf. Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1353 (4th Cir. 1995) (arguing that the ADA 
applies to prison inmates); see generally Korn, supra note 7, at 25 (exploring obesity as 
disability under the ADA). 
217  EEOC Interpretive Manual, supra note 91, § 902.2(c)(5)(ii) n.15 (“The term 
‘obesity’ has been defined as ‘[t]he excessive accumulation of body fat. Except for heavily 
muscled persons, a body weight 20% over that in standard height-weight tables is 
arbitrarily considered obesity.’” (quoting THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND 
THERAPY 981 (Robert Berkow ed., 16th ed. 1992)). 
218  See CDC.gov, Overweight and Obesity: Defining Overweight and Obesity, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/defining.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (“For 
adults, overweight and obesity ranges are determined by using weight and height to 
calculate a number called the ‘body mass index’ (BMI).”). 
219  This fact is made all the more evident by the dramatic increase in obesity in the 
United States. For an animated map of the increasing prevalence of obesity from 1985 to 
2008, see CDC.gov, Obesity and Overweight: Trends by State 1985–2008, 
http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/trends.html#State (last visited Sept. 1, 2009). 
220  See Michael H. Shapiro, The Technology of Perfection: Performance 
Enhancement and the Control of Attributes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 11, 40 n.87 (1991) (“Of 
course, any population with a variable trait will have upper and lower regions.”). 
221  See infra app. fig.1. 
222  Descriptive statistics—such as averages and medians—“describe certain features 
of the numbers on which they are based and suppress others.” DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN 
M. CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION: METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE, AND 
PRACTICE 126 (1986). 
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numbers in a group from their average.”223 Standard deviation is particularly useful 
when examining a “normal population” of numbers,224 like anthropometric data 
(height, weight, etc.),225 which resemble bell-shaped curves.226 Looking at the 
“range” of a normal population, i.e., from the lowest value to the highest value, 68 
percent of all values will fall within one standard deviation of the mean: 34 percent 
will be within one standard deviation below the mean, and 34 percent will be 
within one standard deviation above the mean.227 Roughly 96 percent of all values 
will fall within two standard deviations from the mean, 48 percent below and 48 
percent above.228 Thus, only 4 percent of the population will fall beyond two 
standard deviations from the mean—the smallest and largest 2 percent of values 
relative to the mean.229   
One can use standard deviation to test the degree to which an assumption, 
called a null hypothesis, is the result of chance.230 An outcome is not likely to be 
the result of chance if it falls more than two standard deviations from the mean, 
because there are only four chances in 100 that the outcome is consistent with the 
assumption.231 Thus, if the assumption is that a person’s height will be average, 
anyone whose height falls beyond two standard deviations from the average—that 
is, anyone among the shortest 2 percent or the tallest 2 percent—is not of average 
(normal) height. Generally, statisticians reject the null hypothesis when there is 
less than a 5 percent probability that the outcome is the product of chance.232 This 
means that any outcome falling beyond 1.96 standard deviations above or below 
the mean is excluded.233 
Applying these principles, the shortest 2.5 percent and the tallest 2.5 percent 
of the population statistically fall outside “normal range” for height. Based on 
national anthropometric data collected by the National Center for Health Statistics, 
men shorter than approximately 5’4” and women shorter than roughly 4’11” would 
fall outside normal range.234   
A 2.5 percentile benchmark ostensibly comports with other regulatory and 
scientific benchmarks for abnormal height. For example, the FDA recommends 
treating idiopathic short stature in children only in cases where the child’s growth 
rate is unlikely to produce an adult height within normal range, which the FDA 
                                                 
223  Id. at 129. 
224  Id. at 140. 
225  See infra app. tbls.1–4. 
226  BARNES & CONLEY, supra note 222, at 140. 
227  ZIMMER, supra note 149, at 242. 
228  See id.  
229  Id; see also infra app. fig.1. 
230  See ZIMMER, supra note 149, at 237. 
231  Id. at 243. 
232  Id. 
233  Id. 
234  This is yet another reason why the EEOC’s interpretive example, based on the 
facts of American Motors, proves unhelpful. In American Motors, the plaintiff was a 4’10” 
female. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text. 
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projects to be sixty-three inches for men and fifty-nine inches for women.235 Both 
the American Academy of Pediatrics and American Association of Clinical 
Endocrinologists define short stature in a similar manner.236 They state that short 
stature is “height that falls more than two standard deviations . . . below the 
national mean for age and sex.”237 In the context of disability benefits provided 
under the Social Security Act, persistent height below the third percentile that is 
also “related to an additional specific medically determinable impairment” 
qualifies as a compensable disability in children. 238 Short adults, however, do not 
qualify for Social Security benefits,239 although the qualifying standards for 
“disability” under the Social Security Administration tend to be more rigorous than 
those for protection under the ADA.240 
Nevertheless, the 2.5 percentile is frustratingly subjective. Although some 
doctors consider height below even the fifth percentile to be outside normal 
range,241 many readily admit that any measure is “totally arbitrary.”242 For 
                                                 
235  FDA Talk Paper, T03-56, FDA Approves Humatrope for Short Stature (July 25, 
2003), available at http://www.scienceblog.com/community/older/archives/M/1/ 
fda0850.htm; see also Lee, supra note 179, at 2578 & Table 1. 
236  See Fox, supra note 24, at 1143. 
237  See id. 
238  20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P., App.1, 100.02 (2008); see also Horn v. Callahan, No. 
96-5257, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 28599, at *4–5 (10th Cir. Sept. 26, 1997) (finding that 
achondroplastic dwarfism—a hereditary condition that retards bone growth—cannot be the 
“additional specific medically determinable impairment” to which a claimant’s growth 
impairment must be “related” under § 100.02); Verret v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Civ. A. No. 
99-3647, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2217, at *16–18 (E.D. La. Feb. 21, 2001) (finding no 
qualifying growth impairment, despite persistence of height below third percentile, absent 
evidence that established its relation to another impairment). 
239  The Social Security Administration determines eligibility for disability benefits on 
the basis of regulations that describe “various physical and mental illnesses and 
abnormalities, most of which are categorized by the body system they affect.” Sullivan v. 
Zebley, S.S.R. No. 91–7c (Cum. Ed. 1991), 1991 SSR LEXIS 7, at *12 (Aug. 1, 1991) 
(citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. I (pt. A)). In addition to those categorized body 
systems—“musculoskeletal, special senses and speech, respiratory, cardiovascular, 
digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine”—there are four 
additional groups of listings not categorized by body system, which include multiple body 
system impairments, neurological impairments, mental disorders, and malignant neoplastic 
diseases. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 n.6 (1990). For children, however, the 
regulations add a category for “growth impairment.” Id. 
240  Cf. Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 797–98 (1999) 
(observing that “[t]he Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides 
benefits to a person with a disability so severe that she is ‘unable to do [her] previous 
work’ and ‘cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in 
the national economy[,]’” whereas the ADA considers merely whether “‘with reasonable 
accommodation’ she could ‘perform the essential functions’ of her job” (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1382c(a)(3), 12111(8)). 
241  See HALL, supra note 5, at 303; Sandberg & Colsman, supra note 12, at 18. 
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example, some researchers suggest that a boy who is just one standard deviation 
below the average height for his age remains at risk for “psychological 
difficulties.”243 Ultimately, the problems associated with short stature may not boil 
down to height at all but rather a person’s “ability to cope with the stresses of 
being short.”244 
 
3.  “Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity” 
 
The second hurdle to establishing a viable “actual impairment” claim involves 
showing how one’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Several 
courts have dismissed height-based claims, before the ADAAA, because the 
plaintiff failed to establish this element. For example, in Reiterman v. Costco 
Wholesale Management # 238,245 the 4’8” female plaintiff claimed that she was 
disabled because her short stature made it difficult to reach her cash register and 
that constant reaching caused her tendinitis.246 The court rejected her ADA claim, 
perfunctorily finding that her height was not a “disability” within the meaning of 
the ADA “because it [did] not ‘substantially limit’ her ability to engage in the 
major life activity of working.”247 Likewise, in Mullet v. American Cargo, Inc.,248 
the district court determined that the plaintiff could not proceed under an “actual 
impairment” theory because he could not identify any major life activity that his 
height kept him from performing.249 
The ADAAA now codifies in the statute a non-exhaustive list of qualifying 
life activities, which includes “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, 
learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.”250 The 
ADAAA further clarifies that a qualifying impairment need only substantially limit 
one such activity in order to render someone “disabled.”251 Concededly, being just 
plain short in most cases does not substantially limit one’s ability to engage in any 
                                                                                                                            
242  HALL, supra note 5, at 303; see also Sharon E. Oberfield, Growth Hormone Use 
in Normal, Short Children—A Plea for Reason, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 557, 557–59 (1999) 
(suggesting that there is no good definition of “short stature”); cf. ADELSON, supra note 
172, at 3 (stating that for dwarfism “any cutoff must be somewhat arbitrary”). 
243  MARTEL & BILLER, supra note 2, at 99. 
244  HALL, supra note 5, at 303. 
245  Civ. A. No. 05-12, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15219, *1 (W.D. Va. July 28, 2005). 
246  Id. at *3–4. 
247  Id. at *8. 
248  Civ. A. No. 03-608, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24245, *1 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 19, 2005). 
249  Id. at *8–9. 
250  ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)). 
251  Id. § 4(a)(1) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(5)(B)); see also Alex B. Long, 
Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, 103 N.W. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 222 (2008) (stating that the 
amendments clarify that “an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity 
need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability”). 
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of the aforementioned life activities, at least under the pre-ADAAA definition of 
“substantially limits” (i.e., “prevents or severely restricts”).252 To argue otherwise 
would be disingenuous. Nevertheless, there may very well be some whose height 
falls so far below the 2.5 percentile threshold (e.g., at the 1st percentile) that their 
short stature does limit a qualifying life activity;253 but that proportion of people is 
small. As such, only a very limited group of individuals could likely successfully 
pursue an “actual impairment” claim applying the pre-ADAAA definition of 
“substantially limits.” 
Yet all may not be lost in the post-ADAAA world. First, the statutory list of 
qualifying major life activities is non-exhaustive and may be interpreted in the 
future to include activities that short stature does substantially limit. Second, 
Congress has directed that the definition of disability be construed broadly254 and 
that impairments be considered in their unmitigated state—that is, before they are 
corrected by medication, assistive technology, accommodations, or 
modifications.255 Third, in keeping with the spirit of the Findings and Purposes 
sections of the ADAAA, the EEOC may in the future retool its definition of 
“substantially limits” to be less restrictive than the pre-ADAAA standard.256 
Finally, it is important to understand that presently identifying short stature as 
an impairment may prove necessary to overcoming those pre-ADAAA cases that 
casually concluded that height can never qualify for protection under the ADA.257 
This body of law could hinder height-based claims brought, not only under the 
“actual impairment” prong, but also the “regarded as” prong.258 
 
B.  “Regarded As” Impaired 
 
Whatever the merits of characterizing height as a disability, there can be no 
doubt that we perceive extreme short stature as a handicap.259 It may be fair to say 
                                                 
252  See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002) (noting 
that it was insufficient to “merely submit evidence of a medical diagnosis of an 
impairment”). 
253  For example, while it is hard to conceive of an otherwise healthy 5’2” man being 
unable to care for himself, a 4’10” man or a 4’8” woman may find it significantly more 
difficult to do so. 
254  ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)). 
255  Id. § 4(a) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)). 
256  See Long, supra note 251, at 219–220. 
257  See supra notes 181–191 and accompanying text. 
258  See infra notes 259–273 and accompanying text. 
259  See Oberfield, supra note 242, at 558 (“What, then, about the use of growth 
hormone for short but otherwise normal children whose parents or physicians believe them 
to be handicapped because of their shortness, or who believe so themselves?”); Colin 
Krivy, Men Calming Down About Measuring Up, THE GLOBE & MAIL, Mar. 8, 1995, at 
A22 (“But shortness, as much as I hate to admit it, is equated with disability. . . . The 
assumption was always that my diminutive size made me deficient in some way and 
therefore I couldn’t possibly be on a par with the lucky tall ones.”). 
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that discrimination against short people is more the result of stereotypes than any 
physical limitations imposed by their short stature.260 As noted earlier, we often 
engage in “gaze behavior”—that is, we subconsciously relegate to a lesser social 
status those who are shorter than we are because we perceive them as physically 
inferior.261 This perception is most evident in, and perhaps has been amplified by, 
the debate over the use of HGH to treat normal, short children.262 
Before the ADAAA, however, merely viewing an extremely short person as 
socially inferior would not have sufficed to render him or her protected. Pre-
ADAAA, a person was covered by the “regarded as” prong of the ADA if (1) a 
covered entity treated a physical or mental impairment as though it substantially 
limited a major life activity, even though the impairment did not; (2) a covered 
impairment substantially limited a major life activity only as a result of the attitude 
of others toward such impairment; or (3) a covered entity treated a person as 
having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity even though a 
person suffered from no such impairment.263 The first two variations required a 
plaintiff to establish a qualifying impairment, while all three variations required 
that an impairment, be it real or perceived, either substantially limit a major life 
activity or be perceived by the employer to substantially limit such activity.264 
Thus, as alluded to above, a pre-ADAAA claim premised on height suffered from 
two major deficiencies: (1) qualifying short stature as an actual impairment, 
particularly given the arbitrariness of the 2.5 percentile threshold for 
impairment;265 and (2) establishing how one’s short stature substantially limited, or 
was perceived by the employer to substantially limit, a major life activity.266 
Under the more permissive ADAAA, however, a person is protected under the 
“regarded as” prong if an employer merely discriminates against him or her 
“because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not 
the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”267 As such, the 
focus under the ADAAA dramatically shifts from the severity of the employer’s 
                                                 
260  Cf. ADELSON, supra note 172, at 2–3 (discussing stereotypes related to dwarfism). 
261  See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
262  See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. Parents of otherwise healthy short 
children have pushed the medical community to treat their children with HGH because they 
fear the psychosocially disabling effects of short stature. See ELLIOTT, supra note 26, at 
241; see also HALL, supra note 5, at 247 (noting that “many children who are severely 
short have nothing obviously wrong with them medically”); Vance & Mauras, supra note 
172, at 1213 (noting that “[p]arental pressure to correct the perceived ‘deficiency’ of short 
stature has been responsible in part for the initiation of [growth hormone] treatment” 
among idiopathically short children). 
263  See 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(h) (2008); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471, 489–90 (1999) (discussing disability under the “regarded as” prong). 
264  See Long, supra note 251, at 223. 
265  See supra notes 181–191, 241–244 and accompanying text. 
266  See supra notes 252–253 and accompanying text. 
267  ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008) (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)) (emphasis added). 
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misperception about an employee’s impairment to merely whether an employee’s 
actual or perceived impairment motivated an adverse employment action.268 
However, the amended “regarded as” prong does not apply to impairments that are 
both “minor” and “transitory” (i.e., those having “an actual or expected duration of 
6 months or less”).269 Moreover, covered employers “need not provide a 
reasonable accommodation or a reasonable modification to policies, practices, or 
procedures to an individual” who is disabled solely under the “regarded as” 
prong.270 
The ADAAA thus resolves the two major deficiencies suffered by “regarded 
as” claims premised on height. First, it renders unimportant whether a person’s 
height is at or below the 2.5 percentile, so long as the employer regards a person’s 
short stature as an impairment. For example, a person at the 2.6 percentile for 
height—who would not otherwise suffer from a qualifying impairment271—could 
still bring a “regarded as” claim if the employer unfairly perceived him or her as 
incapable because of his or her short stature. Second, it does away with the need to 
establish a causal nexus between one’s short stature and substantial limits on a 
major life activity. Finally, although the ADAAA removes the employer’s 
obligation to provide reasonable accommodations from the quiver of remedies 
available to “regarded as” plaintiffs, height discrimination typically manifests in a 
failure to hire, a failure to promote, or disparate wages, none of which ostensibly 
requires accommodations to remedy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
268  See Long, supra note 251, at 224.  
269  ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008) (to be codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)). What constitutes a “minor” impairment, however, is not 
defined by the ADAAA. See Long, supra note 251, at 224. Nevertheless, “minor” and 
“transitory” are stated in the conjunctive, suggesting an impairment that is either minor or 
transitory would still qualify for protection under the “regarded as” prong. Compare 
Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy (June 24, 2008) 
(“The bill [H.R. 3195] does exclude impairments that are both transitory and minor; 
however, those that are one or the other would be covered. . . . The Administration believes 
that the bill should exclude from coverage impairments that are either transitory or 
minor.”), with ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008) 
(excluding from the protections of the “regarded as” prong “impairments that are transitory 
and minor”) (emphasis added). Thus, even though short stature may be considered a minor 
impairment, it arguably qualifies under the “regarded as” prong because it is not transitory. 
270  ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 6(a)(1)(h), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555 (2008) (to be 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12201); see also Long, supra note 251, at 225 (discussing the 
reasonable accommodations section of the ADAAA). 
271  See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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V.  ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION 
 
A.  State and Local Laws 
 
1.  Common Law Tort  
 
Without the explicit protections of antidiscrimination laws, many victims of 
height discrimination in the workplace have had to pursue common law tort 
claims, namely intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). However, a 
plaintiff pursuing an IIED claim because of workplace height discrimination bears 
a heavy burden: he or she must show that the conduct giving rise to the claim was 
extreme and outrageous.272 In Bodnovich v. ABF Freight Systems, Inc.,273 for 
example, the plaintiff was terminated from his job as a manager and sued under 
Ohio law, alleging that his superiors subjected him to “cruel and derisive treatment 
. . . because of his short stature.”274 The court rejected his claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress because it found that he had failed to adduce 
evidence of the requisite extreme and outrageous conduct.275 Likewise, in Micu v. 
Warren,276 the court rejected a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
brought by a male firefighter applicant who sued the City of Warren for rejecting 
his application on the basis of his short stature.277 
Conversely, in Chea v. Men’s Wearhouse, Inc.,278 the Court of Appeals of 
Washington sustained a verdict in a negligent infliction of emotional distress case 
returned in favor of an employee who had endured frequent negative (and 
sometimes violent) comments about his short stature and Asian heritage.279 
Similarly, the short female plaintiff in Edwards v. New Opportunities Inc.280 
survived a motion to dismiss her IIED claim because the court found that her 
employer’s behavior was extreme and outrageous.281 She alleged that “she was 
referred to as Dopey because of her short stature and accent and that a nine-foot 
                                                 
272  See infra notes 273–277 and accompanying text. 
273  No. 93-B-36, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 5598 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1994). 
274  Id. at *1–2. 
275  Id. at *7; see also Schlumbrecht v. Fidelity Homestead Ass’n, Civ. A. No. 03-
3001, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14487, at *26–32 (E.D. La. Mar. 30, 2006) (finding that the 
plaintiff had failed to establish as required by Louisiana law). 
276  382 N.W.2d 823 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). 
277  Id. at 824–25. However, the Michigan Court of Appeals did find in favor of the 
plaintiff with respect to his state antidiscrimination law claim. See id. at 828; see also infra 
note 288 (discussing Micu in the context of Michigan’s antidiscrimination law). 
278  932 P.2d 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
279  Id. at 1262–63. 
280  Civ. A. No. 05-1238, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21667, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 
2007). 
281  Id. at *28. 
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cutout of Snow White was positioned outside of the building with her nickname 
attached . . . .”282 
In sum, because common law tort claims involving height discrimination are 
held to a far more rigorous standard than such claims would be held to under 
federal antidiscrimination laws, state tort laws do not provide much protection in 
run-of-the-mill cases of workplace height discrimination. 
 
2.  State and Local Antidiscrimination Laws 
 
In the absence of a federal law explicitly prohibiting height discrimination, 
and in light of the inadequacies of state tort law, several state and local 
governments have endeavored to fill the gaps in protection by promulgating 
statutory protections against height discrimination. One state, Michigan, 
affirmatively proscribes discrimination on the basis of height,283 while another, 
Massachusetts, has actively considered protecting against height discrimination but 
has not yet passed such legislation.284 The District of Columbia has taken a more 
general approach, condemning employment discrimination on the basis of 
“personal appearance,” which includes “bodily . . . characteristics” such as 
height.285 And several municipal governments in California—including those in 
San Francisco and Santa Cruz—have directly taken on height discrimination in the 
workplace.286 
Nevertheless, even in jurisdictions where laws explicitly prohibit height 
discrimination, few pure height discrimination cases have been brought,287 and 
                                                 
282  Id. at *28 n.10. 
283  See Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act of 1976, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 37.2202(1)(a) 
(2009). 
284  See generally Courtney N. Kubilis, Note, “Weighting” for Protection in 
Massachusetts: The Myth of Equal Opportunity in Employment, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
211, 211 (2008) (observing that a bill that would prohibit height and weight discrimination 
in employment had been presented to but rejected by the Massachusetts legislature at least 
ten times). The New York and Texas legislatures rejected measures similar to Michigan’s 
Elliott-Larsen Act. See Kristen, supra note 7, at 100 n.300. 
285  See D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C. CODE § 2-1401.02 (2001). 
286  See SANTA CRUZ, CAL., MUN. CODE § 9.83.010 (1995); S.F., CAL., CODE Chs. 
12A–C (1999); S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33 (1994). The San Francisco law liberally 
defines height as “encompass[ing] but . . . not limited to an impression of a person as tall or 
short regardless of numerical measurement.” City & County of San Francisco Human 
Rights Commission, Compliance Guidelines to Prohibit Weight & Height Discrimination § 
II.B (2001), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/sfhumanrights_page.asp?id=5911. 
287  For example, a discrimination investigator with the San Francisco Human Rights 
Commission could not find a single complaint alleging height discrimination since the city 
passed the law. See E-mail from Holy Old Man Bull (formerly known as Marcus de Maria 
Arana), Discrimination Investigator, San Francisco Human Rights Commission (Jan. 27, 
2009, 19:03:47 EST) (on file with author). Likewise, the Assistant Director of the City of 
Santa Cruz Human Resources Department could not recall a single complaint or record 
filed under the ordinance alleging height discrimination. See E-mail from Joe McMullen, 
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even fewer have been successful.288 Part of the problem may be, as mentioned 
above, that height discrimination tends to be implicit, rarely manifesting in overtly 
discriminatory conduct. Thus, victims of height discrimination either may not 
realize they are being discriminated against or may not be able to amass sufficient 
evidence of discriminatory motive. Another part of the problem may be that some 
misapprehend what these laws actually protect against. For example, given that 
Michigan’s law was passed almost contemporaneously with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Dothard v. Rawlinson,289—which held that an Alabama statute that 
imposed minimum height and weight requirements on prison guards violated Title 
VII because it disqualified over 40 percent of female applicants but less than 1 
percent of male applicants290—some might mistake that law’s solicitude of height 
as just another (i.e., less onerous) way to allege a gender-based disparate impact 
claim.291 And yet another part of the problem might be that these jurisdictions have 
instituted protections against height discrimination merely to put themselves in the 
“vanguard of anti-discrimination,” without any genuine or practical concern for 
height-based discrimination in the workplace.292 
                                                                                                                            
Assistant Dir., City of Santa Cruz Human Res. Dep’t (Jan. 13, 2009, 12:47:18 EST) (on file 
with author). 
288  There appears to be only one case of record in which a plaintiff alleging a claim of 
height discrimination prevailed under District of Columbia law. See Coleman v. District of 
Columbia, 700 A.2d 232, 233 (D.C. 1997). In Michigan, which has prohibited height 
discrimination since 1976, most of the mere handful of height-based cases litigated have 
failed because of pleading deficiencies or the absence of evidence establishing 
discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Terry v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. 263339, 2005 Mich. 
App. LEXIS 3202, at *4–5 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2005) (finding no direct evidence of 
discrimination where the plaintiff testified that she thought she was too short for the job to 
which she was assigned while admitting that management personnel told her they thought 
she could do the job); Berry v. Way Bakeries, Inc., No. 248841, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 
459, at *11–13 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2005) (finding that plaintiff was properly 
terminated, in spite of her short stature, because plaintiff's height affected her ability to 
perform certain tasks and gave rise to safety concerns). However, plaintiffs have 
successfully brought more “traditional” claims premised on height. See, e.g., Roskamp v. 
Cigna Sec., Inc., Civ. A. No. 89-60122, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17850, at *1–3 (W.D. 
Mich. Sept. 28, 1989) (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment where pseudo-
achondroplastic dwarf alleged that he was not hired because of his height); Micu v. City of 
Warren, 382 N.W.2d 823, 827–28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (finding fire department could not 
discriminate on the basis of height in hiring firefighters unless it established height as a 
bona fide occupational qualification). 
289  433 U.S. 321 (1977). Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Act was enacted in 1976 and 
became effective March 31, 1977. Dothard was argued in April 1977 and decided in June 
1977. 
290  Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329–31. 
291  Cf. Kristen, supra note 7, at 101 (“Michigan’s Ombudsman commented that one 
reason height . . . [was] added to the law was that ‘certain height . . . characteristics tend to 
be linked to certain ethnic groups or to women.’”). 
292  Cf. E-mail from Joe McMullen, Assistant Dir., City of Santa Cruz Human Res. 
Dep’t. (Jan. 13, 2009, 20:31:32 EST) (on file with author) (“The City Manager recalls that 
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B.  Why a Federal Prohibition on Height Discrimination Is Unnecessary 
 
As discussed above, gender- and disability-based theories under existing 
federal law provide protection against many cases of height discrimination—but 
neither theory is perfect. The gender-based theory would substantially protect short 
men and tall women, leaving short women, tall men, and all people of average 
height with no protection. A disability-based theory would only protect people 
whose height falls outside the “normal range” and those whose short stature an 
employer perceives as an impairment, but would not protect the vast majority of 
people. 
Nevertheless, these two theories do capture the two most significant 
prejudices underlying height discrimination. The question remains, what should be 
done, if anything, about height-based employment decisions involving everyone 
else? A flat federal prohibition on height-based employment decisions first comes 
to mind. 
 
1.  Such a Prohibition Would Be Overinclusive 
 
Although height is an immutable trait—and despite the fact that 
antidiscrimination laws are premised, at least in part, on the notion that arbitrary 
decisions based on immutable traits are unfair and immoral293—not all height-
based employment decisions are motivated by prejudice. Thus, a flat federal 
prohibition on height-based employment decisions, while being the easiest to 
administer, would be overinclusive. After all, an employer is generally free to 
prefer certain traits to others so long as that preference does not rise to the level of 
impermissible prejudice.294 
Still, some federal antidiscrimination laws, such as Title VII, overinclude by 
prohibiting trait-based employment decisions that may not actually be motivated 
by prejudice.295 That is, Title VII prohibits the consideration of covered traits in all 
their variations and renders everyone a member of the protected class: its 
protections extend not only to minorities who are most likely to be victims of 
                                                                                                                            
the City Council wanted to be in the vanguard of anti-discrimination, but that there was not 
an event or anything that occurred that they were responding to [in passing the law].”); 
Kubilis, supra note 284, at 225 (quoting the Michigan’s Ombudsman as saying that 
“[t]here wasn’t even much debate about [passing the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act]” and 
that the law passed with ease). 
293  See ZIMMER, supra note 149, at 31. 
294  See id.; see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) (“By its 
terms, the ADA allows employers to prefer some physical attributes over others and to 
establish physical criteria.”). 
295  Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (“The appropriateness of 
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong measures 
appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.” 
(citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 334 (1966))). 
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prejudice, but to everyone. Thus, Congress has implicitly determined that the price 
of overinclusion is justified because the distinction between invidious prejudice 
and benign preference as to Title VII’s covered traits may be too subtle to be 
trusted. 
Conversely, some federal antidiscrimination laws, like the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)296 and the ADA, are carefully 
circumscribed to prohibit consideration of specified traits only in limited cases, 
protecting only certain subgroups of people sharing a common trait. For example, 
although everyone has an “age,” the ADEA only prohibits an employer from 
considering the age of those who are at least 40 years old because, according to 
Congress, such older employees are most likely to be victims of prejudice.297 As 
such, younger employees are not protected even though they share the common 
trait of “age” with protected employees. Similarly, although millions of people 
may be classified as “impaired,” protections under the ADA extend only to 
employees whose impairments rise to the level of a disability; those who merely 
have impairments that do not qualify as disabilities are not protected, even though 
they share the common trait of “impairment” with those covered by the statute.298 
Thus, Congress has implicitly determined that the price of overinclusion as to these 
traits is not justified because the prejudice-preference distinction can be clearly 
drawn with respect to these traits. 
 
2.  Overinclusion Would Not Be Justified 
 
So how does one determine whether the price of overinclusion is justified? A 
useful shortcut may be the Equal Protection Clause itself. Classifications based on 
certain traits receive heightened scrutiny under the clause.299 These include all of 
those traits covered by Title VII: race, religion, national origin, color, and 
gender.300 Under heightened scrutiny, classifications based on these traits are 
presumptively invalid.301 However, classifications based on traits such as age and 
                                                 
296  29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006). 
297  See id. § 621(a)(1) (“The Congress hereby finds and declares that . . . in the face 
of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their 
efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from 
jobs.”). 
298  See supra Part IV.A. 
299  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
539–42 (3d ed. 2006). 
300  See generally id. at 541–42, 671(describing strict scrutiny). 
301  See id. at 541–42 (observing that the proponent of the law, i.e., the government, 
bears the burden of proving the validity of the law under intermediate and strict scrutiny 
review); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The 
general rule gives way, however, when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national 
origin. These factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and 
antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. 
2009] HEIGHT DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 947 
 
disability receive mere rational basis review and are presumptively valid;302 they 
need only be rational to survive.303 Put simply, the level of overinclusiveness 
tolerated of a federal antidiscrimination law ostensibly coincides with the review 
given to the traits covered by that law under the Equal Protection Clause. 
This brings us full circle. Whether the costs of a flat prohibition on height-
based employment decisions would be justified, despite its overinclusiveness, 
depends on the level of scrutiny a court would apply to height under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Based on precedential and pragmatic considerations, however, 
height need not receive heightened review, and, thus, any law prohibiting height 
discrimination could not broadly prohibit all height-based considerations in 
employment. 
When deciding whether to apply heightened scrutiny to a given classification, 
the Supreme Court has generally favored (1) immutable characteristics, (2) groups 
traditionally unable to protect themselves through the political process, and (3) 
groups with a history of being discriminated against.304 Although height is surely 
immutable, as an abstract trait it does not constitute a “discrete and insular 
minorit[y],”305 and thus generally fails to satisfy the second and third factors.306 
From a practical standpoint, moreover, the Supreme Court has not seen fit within 
the past 30 years to broaden the categories of classifications receiving heightened 
scrutiny.307 The Court’s decision in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living 
Center, Inc.,308 succinctly captures the essence of the Court’s reluctance. When 
faced with the plaintiffs’ request to treat mental retardation as a quasi-suspect 
classification entitled to heightened scrutiny, the Court declined, observing that 
 
                                                                                                                            
For these reasons, and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by 
legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny, and will be sustained only if 
they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”). 
302  See generally Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 582 U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000) (discussing 
discrimination based on age); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 (discussing discrimination 
based on disability). 
303  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 299, at 540 (noting that, under rational basis 
review, the opponent of the law has the burden of proving its invalidity). 
304  See id. at 672–73. 
305  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[W]hether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”). 
306  However, it may very well be that short people lack political power commensurate 
with their numbers among the general population. See supra notes 15–19 and 
accompanying text (observing the paucity of short presidents); cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 299, at 672 (“Women, for example, are more than half the population, but traditionally 
they have been severely underrepresented in political offices.”). 
307  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 299, at 672. 
308  473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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[i]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed 
quasi-suspect . . . it would be difficult to find a principled way to 
distinguish a variety of other groups who perhaps have immutable 
disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate 
the desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of 
prejudice from at least part of the public at large. One need mention in 
this respect only the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. 
We are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do so.  
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be instances of 
discrimination against the retarded that are in fact invidious, and that are 
properly subject to judicial correction under constitutional norms. But the 
appropriate method of reaching such instances is not to create a new 
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental action based 
on that classification to more searching evaluation. Rather, we should 
look to the likelihood that governmental action premised on a particular 
classification is valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of 
the case before us.309 
 
Put simply, height-based classifications would and should only receive 
rational basis review.310 To be sure, there may be circumstances where the 
government invidiously classifies on the basis of height (as it has with disability); 
but, such classifications are likely to fail even under the least rigorous rational 
basis review.311 
Because height-based classifications would receive rational basis review 
under the Equal Protection Clause, any federal law prohibiting height-based 
employment decisions would have to be narrowly drawn to address only those 
employment decisions motivated by a height-based prejudice. Such a narrowly 
drawn prohibition would necessarily cover short people of all genders, and tall 
women. However, these groups are already protected, albeit somewhat crudely, 
                                                 
309  Id. at 445–46 (emphasis added). The Court went on to note that “mental 
retardation is a characteristic that the government may legitimately take into account in a 
wide range of decisions, and . . . we will not presume that any given legislative action, even 
one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in considerations that the Constitution 
will not tolerate.” Id. at 446. Ultimately, the Court invalidated the classifications as lacking 
a rational relation to a legitimate government purpose. See id. at 450.  
310  See Ekerman v. City of Chicago, Civ. A. No. 01-9686, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8711, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2002) (“Employment decisions based solely on height do not 
violate the equal protection clause; neither can a coworker’s mere recognition of a 
plaintiff’s physical stature.” (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)). 
311  See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 447–50; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
632 (1996) (finding unconstitutional Colorado’s Amendment 2—which effectively 
prohibited the passing of antidiscrimination laws protecting homosexuals—because “its 
sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems 
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational 
relationship to legitimate state interests”). 
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under existing federal laws: short men under the ADA and Title VII; short women 
under the ADA; and tall women under Title VII.312 As such, any new federal law 
prohibiting height-based employment decisions would be redundant. Moreover, 
passing such a sweeping law would be practically and politically problematic, 
given increasing aversion to the expansion of antidiscrimination laws.313 
 
C.  A Proposal 
 
Although a federal bar on height-based employment decisions would be 
gratuitous, modest changes to the regulations and interpretive guidance covering 
Title VII and the ADA would help to clarify the scope and contours of those laws’ 
protections with respect to height. A change in the regulations, moreover, is 
preferable to a change in the statutes themselves because the federal rulemaking 
process is less political and more flexible than the legislative process.314 
For example, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h) states that “‘impairment’ 
does not include physical characteristics such as . . . height, weight or muscle tone 
that are within ‘normal’ range and are not the result of a physiological disorder.” 
As noted above, however, most courts have read this to mean that height cannot 
constitute an impairment on its own if not caused by a physiological disorder.315 
Although the EEOC has not adopted such a narrow view in its Interpretive 
Manual,316 the regulation itself could be rephrased to make the disjunctive nature 
of the exclusion more evident. Thus, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(h) could be 
amended to read that “‘impairment’ does not include physical characteristics such 
as . . . height . . . that are either within ‘normal’ range or are not the result of a 
physiological disorder.” Such a simple change to the regulation would counteract 
the bulk of pre-ADAAA cases that wrongly read the regulations to prohibit claims 
premised on height, and would permit height-based claims to proceed beyond 
motions to dismiss, where so many discrimination plaintiffs lose now that the 
Supreme Court has made federal pleading requirements more rigorous. 317 
                                                 
312  See supra Parts III, IV.2. 
313  Consider the backlash against the Massachusetts bill that would outlaw height and 
weight discrimination. See generally Kubilis, supra note 284, at 229–30 (describing 
resistance to the bill); see also Editorial, Don’t Bloat Books with Pointless Laws, BOSTON 
HERALD, Mar. 25, 2008, at 18 (“Yes, it is a sad thing if a person who is short or obese feels 
the sting of cruel comments. But to equate that with the legacy of racial or gender 
discrimination in the workplace is simply insulting.”); cf. ZIMMER, supra note 149, at 32–
33 (listing arguments against antidiscrimination laws). 
314  See WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE & PRACTICE 48–49 
(3rd ed. 2006) (describing the procedures necessary for agency rulemaking). 
315  See supra notes 169, 181–191 and accompanying text. 
316  See supra note 169. 
317  See generally Joseph Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading 
Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011 (forthcoming 
2009) (observing that more than 80 percent of motions to dismiss decided between six and 
twelve months after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), were at least 
950 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
 
In addition, state and local governments should consider extending 
protections against height-based prejudice in the workplace, even if such 
protections have not been widely invoked by plaintiffs in those jurisdictions that 
have enacted such protections.318 Jurisdictions that decide to pass such laws should 
consider explicitly but conservatively expanding protections beyond those offered 
by the federal laws. For example, a state law typifying an extreme deviation in 
height as an impairment might do well to broaden the definition to height at or 
below the third percentile, ensuring that victims at the margin of the clinical 
definition of profound short stature are not left unprotected. 
Of course, jurisdictions could also adopt sweeping protections against height-
based employment decisions, such as those enacted in Michigan and the District of 
Columbia, if they determine that such protections are worth their commensurate 
costs. After all, the availability of state and local prohibitions may actually 
decrease litigation by increasing the frequency of mediation and negotiation.319 
Moreover, having access to multiple court systems would help to more evenly 
distribute the burden of resolving height-based discrimination claims (if such 
claims become fashionable). Ultimately, a victim of height discrimination should 
have at his or her disposal a full panoply of remedies, both federal and other, when 
he or she decides to challenge heightism that has adversely affected him or her at 
work. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Heightism does exist, and its effects in the employment context are 
undeniable, even if its causes are less obvious. Many victims of height 
discrimination have tried in earnest to challenge the adverse treatment they faced 
because of their stature, and many have failed. Nevertheless, discrimination claims 
premised on height remain viable under both Title VII and the ADA. 
                                                                                                                            
partially granted, compared with 75 percent prior to Twombly); Nathan Koppel, Job 
Discrimination Cases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, 
at A16 (observing that “federal judges also now routinely terminate employment-
discrimination cases through motions to dismiss, meaning that the plaintiffs aren’t allowed 
to conduct fact finding to support their claims”). In Twombly, the Supreme Court raised the 
pleading standard that applies to federal complaints, now requiring that “[f]actual 
allegations . . . be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” 550 
U.S. at 555. Subsequently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), the Supreme Court 
clarified the scope of its decision in Twombly, stating that “Rule 8 marks a notable and 
generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it 
does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than 
conclusions” and holding that Rule 8 is satisfied only “where the well-pleaded facts . . . 
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct . . . .” 129 S. Ct. at 
1950 (emphasis added). 
318  See supra notes 287–292 and accompanying text. 
319  Cf. Kubilis, supra note 284, at 232–33 (describing the salutary effects caused by 
the Michigan, Santa Cruz, and San Francisco laws). 
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Discrimination against short men and tall women because of their height may 
constitute discrimination on the basis of a gender stereotype; employment 
decisions motivated by such stereotypes are unlawful. Discrimination against the 
profoundly short (i.e., those at or below the 2.5 percentile) because of their stature 
is likewise impermissible. Recent changes to the ADA, coupled with a fresh look 
at the regulatory scheme, suggests pre-ADAAA cases were wrong in summarily 
concluding that height-based discrimination is not actionable under the ADA. 
In the end, federal law should prohibit height-based employment decisions 
motivated by prejudice, but a comprehensive law would be unfeasible. The fact is 
that existing federal law already prohibits the vast majority of cases involving such 
prejudice, and the costs of expanding federal law to ban all height-based 
employment decisions outweigh the benefits of such expansion. Nevertheless, 
modest amendments to the federal regulations—as well as the passing of 
protections against height discrimination by state and local governments—would 
go a long way in preventing this form of invidious prejudice.  
 
“Short People are just the same 
As you and I 
(A Fool Such As I) 
All men are brothers 
Until the day they die 
(It’s A Wonderful World).”320 
                                                 
320  NEWMAN, supra note 1. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1 – Standard Deviation 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Mean Standing Height in Inches for All Males Age 20 and Older: 
United States, 1999–2002321 
 
Age  
(in years) 
Mean Percentile 
 5th 10th 15th 25th 50th 75th 85th 90th 95th 
20 and 
older 69.3 64.1 65.4 66.2 67.3 69.3 71.3 72.3 73.1 74.2 
20-29  69.6 64.1 65.7 66.5 67.5 69.6 71.4 72.6 73.5 74.6 
30-39 69.5 64.2 65.7 66.3 67.4 69.3 71.6 72.6 73.3 74.4 
40-49  69.7 65.1  66.1 66.7 67.7 69.6 71.7 72.6 73.2  74.4 
50-59  69.2 64.0  65.4 66.2 67.2 69.3 71.4 72.3 73.0  73.9 
60 -69  68.8 64.4  65.1 65.8 67.0 68.9 70.7 71.7 72.3  73.1 
70-79  68.0 63.0  64.3 64.9 65.9 68.1 70.1 71.0 71.5  72.5 
80 and 
older 67.2 62.8  63.7 64.5 65.4 67.1 69.0 70.0 70.6  71.7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
321  Data derived from Margaret A. McDowell et al., Anthropometric Reference Data 
for Children and Adults: U.S. Population, 1999–2002, at 6 (Centers for Disease Control: 
Advance Data From Vital Health Statistics, No. 361, July 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad361.pdf. 
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Table 2 – Mean Standing Height in Inches for All Females Age 20 and older: 
United States, 1999–2002322 
 
Age  
(in years) 
Mean Percentile 
5th 10th 15th 25th 50th 75th 85th 90th 95th 
20 and 
older 63.8 59.4 60.3 61.0 62.0 63.8 65.6 66.5 67.3 68.2 
20-29  64.1 59.9 60.5 61.4 62.3 64.1 65.8 67.0 67.5 68.4 
30-39  64.2 59.9 60.8 61.5 62.4 64.2 65.9 66.9 67.5 68.6 
40-49  64.3 59.9  60.8 61.5 62.5 64.3 66.1 67.0 67.6  68.7 
50-59  63.9 59.7  60.6 61.3 62.1 63.9 65.5 66.4 67.2  68.1 
60-69  63.2 59.0  59.9 60.7 61.6 63.2 64.9 65.8 66.5  67.1 
70-79  62.6 58.4  59.1 59.9 61.0 62.6 64.1 65.3 65.8  66.6 
80 and 
older 61.3 57.4  58.1 58.9 59.8 61.4 62.8 63.7 64.4  65.6 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Stature-for-Age Percentiles 
for Boys Age 20 (Derived from CDC 
Growth Charts)323 
 
Percentile Height (in inches) 
3rd 64.3 
5th 65 
10th 66 
25th 67.7 
50th 69.6 
75th 71.5 
90th 73.2 
95th 74.2 
97th 74.9 
 
Table 4 – Stature-for-Age Percentiles 
for Girls Age 20 (Derived from CDC 
Growth Charts)324 
 
Percentile Height (in inches) 
3rd 59.5 
5th 60.1 
10th 61.0 
25th 62.6 
50th 64.3 
75th 66.0 
90th 67.6 
95th 68.5 
97th 69.1 
 
 
                                                 
322 Id. 
323  See CDC, CDC Growth Charts: United States, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/growthcharts. Raw percentile data can be accessed at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhanes/growthcharts/zscore/statage.xls. 
324  Id. 
